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This paper surveys some of the antecedents of the modern idea of human rights. It begins with an 
analysis of the evolution of ideas of natural law and natural rights in Western ethical traditions and 
political thought. Some points of departure for responding to the relativist critique are then mapped 
out and the ideas of human rights thinkers and activists from around the world are examined in the 
context of different philosophies and religions. The paper concludes that in diverse countries and 
cultures, the presence of deep-rooted traditions of universalism, tolerance, freedom, concern for 
the poor and needy, interpersonal obligation and government responsibility provide foundations for 
the development of modern theories of human rights. Furthermore, the modern idea of human 
rights is itself changing and evolving in response to diverse influences. New conceptual 
frameworks are emerging for thinking about the cross-cultural foundations of human rights, and for 
thinking about human rights, poverty and development.  1. ANTECEDENTS OF THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT  
It is often suggested that the modern idea of human rights is based on, or has evolved from, the 
ideas of natural law and natural rights. The sub-sections that follow survey the historical evolution 
of these ideas in Western political thought, from their origins in Ancient Greece, to their 
development in the modern period.  
1.1 Theories of natural law: Origins in Ancient Greece  
   
Claims that certain actions or policies are contrary to, or are in violation of, human rights are often 
explained and justified with reference to the idea of natural law. For example, certain actions or 
policies may be asserted to be ‘inhuman’ or ‘unnaturally cruel’. In international law and 
jurisprudence, the idea of ‘crimes against humanity’ is sometimes explained and justified not in 
terms of positive law, but in terms of appeals to the idea of a ‘higher law’ or ‘natural law’. Broadly 
speaking, a natural law theory locates claims of these types in the context of a general theory of 
the good in human life, and of right and wrong in human choices and actions (Finnis, 1998, 685).  
The historical origins of the idea of natural law are commonly traced back to Ancient Greece. 
Generally speaking, the roots of this idea are located in the works of Aristotle. However, as Buckle 
(1993) suggests, many theories of natural law are associated with the ideas of "universalism" and 
an "unchanging ethical order"; and to this extent, the roots of the idea of natural law can also be 
located in Plato's ethical theories.  
Plato's "universalism" and the idea of an "unchanging ethical order"  
Plato proposed that in the realm of ethics - as well as in the realm of mathematics and aesthetics - 
there exist abstract, eternal and universal truths that exist as elements of an "unchanging natural 
order". They exist independently of human observation and can be apprehended by processes of 
reasoning. In elaborating this theory, Plato suggested that the empirical facts of ethical diversity 
and disagreement in the world do not necessarily challenge the validity of universal truths, because 
diversity and disagreement do not preclude the conclusion of some views being right and others 
wrong2. These ideas have had an important and enduring influence on Western political thought. 
Over the centuries, advocates of universalism have defended the proposition that ethical values 
can have universal validity in the context of different historical epochs, different societies and 
different cultures. However, this proposition has been criticised by advocates of the various forms 
of relativism (epistemological, ethical, cultural etc), who have suggested that ethical values are 
particular, contingent and contextual, rather than universal and absolute. This debate - which 
characterises many of the modern controversies in the field of human rights today - was 
foreshadowed by philosophical debates in Ancient Greece. Plato's theories were challenged on the 
ground that they ignored the important role of culture in the formulation of ethical belief. As Wong 
suggests, traders and travellers were well-informed about the great variety of moral beliefs and 
cultural practices prevalent in the world. For example, an ancient text associated with the Sophists 
suggests that while, for the Lacedaemonians, it was fine for girls to exercise without tunics, and for 
children not to learn music and letters, for the Ionians, these things were "foul" (1993, 443). The 
Greek historian Herodotus also highlighted the importance of the role of culture in shaping ethical belief in his account of the Persian Wars. Herodotus chronicled the story of Darius, King of Persia, 
who - in asking different ethnic groups about their rituals for the treatment of the dead - 
encountered fundamental differences in ethical and cultural practices. Herodotus invoked these 
differences as the basis of a fundamental challenge to the idea of universal values, noting that:  
" ... (I)f one were to offer men to choose out of all the customs in the world such as seemed to 
them the best, they would examine the whole number, and end by preferring their own; so 
convinced are they that their own usages far surpass those of all others" ([c.400-500 B.C.] 1992, 
236). 
Plato attempted to refute the relativist challenge and to defend the idea of the objectivity of ethical 
values. He attributed to Protagoras the view that the beliefs of every person are true for that person 
- so that truth is simply what the community judges truth to be, rather than "external" or "objective" 
knowledge - and suggested that this view is self-defeating ([c.360BC] 1987, 66). Plato's question 
Can there be objective ethical values? relates to the modern question, Is there such a thing as a 
universal human right? and provided the context in which Aristotle developed his ethical theories.  
Aristotle and the "facts" of human nature  
The philosophical roots of the idea of natural law are generally located in Aristotle's ethical 
theories. Whereas Plato's idea of "objective ethical standards" is associated with the idea of an 
"unchanging natural order", theories of natural law often imply that objective and prescriptively 
binding principles of right conduct (or right reason) can be derived from certain "facts" about human 
nature and existence. Aristotle laid the foundations for this approach. He suggested that it is 
possible to reject the Platonic search for universal values based on the idea of an "unchanging 
ethical order" and methods of abstract reasoning, without sliding into relativism and scepticism - by 
invoking human nature. In Aristotle's view, humans are distinguished by the capacity to reason and 
to exercise rational choices, and these general features of human nature can provide foundations 
for accounts of human flourishing or well-being (eudaimonia), human good and good political 
arrangements ([c.330 B.C.] 1998). In defending and elaborating this view, Aristotle proposed:  
"It is evident that the best politeia is that arrangement (taxis) according to which anyone 
whatsoever (hostisoun) might do best (arista prattoi) and live a flourishing life (zoie makarios)" 
[Politics, 1324a23-5, as translated in Nussbaum (1988, 146)]. 
Although Aristotle has been criticised in the modern literature on political liberalism (e.g. in relation 
to the "over-specification of the theory of the good"), and in the modern literature on equality, 
democracy and rights (e.g. in relation to women and slavery3), his work can be interpreted as 
setting the stage for subsequent theories of individual rights based on appeals to human nature4. 
Aristotle's recognition of the importance of human flourishing has been highlighted in recent 
thinking about universalism, capabilities and human rights, with Sen emphasising Aristotle's "clear 
articulation of the importance of free exercise of capability" (1997,37), and Nussbaum explicitly 
building on an Aristotelian approach (see Box)5. More generally, Aristotle's broad impact on the 
historical development of the idea of natural law is widely acknowledged. In Ancient Greece, the 
Stoics developed Aristotle's emphasis on the exercise of rational capacities, and formulated what 
has been described as the "distinctive claim" of natural law theories - the claim that the natural law, 
the law of nature, is the law of human nature, and that this law is reason. It was in this form that the 
idea of natural law was transmitted to the Roman and Medieval Worlds (Buckle, 1993, 163-4).  
   Nussbaum on capabilities and human rights 
In elaborating a theory of capabilities and human rights, Nussbaum (1988, 1990, 1993, 1995a, 
1995b, 1999abc) has explicitly built on an Aristotelian approach. Rejecting both the realist 
proposition that universal values can be identified through abstract processes of reasoning, and 
the relativist proposition that universal values are not possible because there is no “objective” 
methodology for evaluating rival ethical claims, she has defended and elaborated the idea that a 
universal conception of a human being is “both available to ethics and a valuable starting point” 
(1995a, 70). In Nussbaum’s view, shared understandings of the constituent elements of 
humanness and a good human life may be available across societies and cultures. Empirical 
methods and anthropological research can help to identify a set of “central and basic” capabilities 
that “is not the mere projection of local preferences, but is fully international” - providing a basis 
for “cross-cultural attunement” (1995a, 74-81). In addition, Nussbaum has followed Aristotle in 
linking the possibility of a universal account of human functioning to a theory of political 
arrangements. She has argued that a human life that lacks basic and central capabilities may in 
some sense fall short of being a “good” human life. In Nussbaum’s view, this gap between the 
potential capability for a good human life, and the full realization of such a life, gives rise to moral 
claims on governments - providing a basis for contemporary ideas about political obligation and 
human rights (1995a, 74-88).  
“[W]e believe that certain basic and central human endowments have a claim to be assisted in 
developing, and exert that claim on others, and especially, as Aristotle saw, on government … I 
think … [this] is the underlying basis, in the Western philosophical tradition, for many notions of 
human rights. I suggest, then … we begin from this notion, thinking of the basic capabilities of 
human beings as needs for functioning, which give rise to correlated political duties” (Nussbaum, 
1995a, 88). 
1.2 The development of theories of natural law and natural rights: The Roman, Medieval and 
Early Modern periods  
The ideas of natural law and natural rights in the Roman World  
The Roman lawyer Cicero is widely credited as transmitting the idea of natural law from Ancient 
Greece to the Roman world, and thereby to the Christian thinkers of the Medieval period. The 
following passage - regarded by many political theorists as the paradigmatic statement of the idea 
of natural law - reflects the ways in which the Ancient Greek ideas of natural law were expounded 
as a basis for political life in Roman times. The idea of natural law, with its emphasis on the "facts" 
of human nature, ultimately functioned to legitimise the idea of a single, universal and eternal body 
of law throughout the Roman Empire.  
"True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and 
everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions 
... It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is 
impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people ... 
(and) there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the 
future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there 
will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its 
promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying 
his human nature, and by reason of this ... he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes 
what is commonly considered punishment" ([c.52 BC] 1928, 211). There are complex jurisprudential debates as to whether or not the modern idea of an individual 
subjective right - understood as a power or claim - was reflected in classical Roman law. These 
debates are surveyed in Tuck (1979, 7-13) and revolve around the interpretation of the terms 
dominium and ius, usually translated as property and right. The term dominium is often interpreted 
as implying not only proprietorship, but also mastery and control - and the issue at stake is whether 
the term ius (a derivative of the term dominum) can be understood not only in so-called "objective" 
terms - that is, as what is rightful - but also subjectively, as an individual power or claim. As Tuck 
explains, some authors (notably Villey) have criticised attempts to trace the modern idea of a 
subjective right back to classical Roman law. In contrast, Tuck suggests that the terms dominium 
and ius were subject to a process of historical development and re-interpretation during the Roman 
period, and that subjective interpretations of ius came to the fore. For example, the emergence of 
the idea of public rights like rights of way resulted in an interpretation of the term ius as "something 
which one possessed as a result of one's relationship with the state, the public or the Emperor" 
(1979, 11).  
The development of the ideas of natural law and natural rights in Medieval Europe  
The idea of natural law was central to philosophical and theological debates during the Medieval 
period. It was invoked to justify and promote many different theories and agendas - from absolute 
rule, the divine right of kings and obedience, to early ideas about human rights. The theologian 
Thomas Aquinas (1226-74) is remembered for his humanising and liberalising influences on 
natural law thinking. Harmonising the Christian idea of original sin with the Aristotelian concept of 
human flourishing, Aquinas developed a new theological, moral and political theory that provides 
an account of the relationships between four types of law - eternal law, natural law, divine law, and 
human (positive) law - that has been widely adopted as a basis for Roman Catholic teaching. 
Aquinas argued that natural law is that part of eternal law revealed to rational beings in the form of 
reason, and has its basis in human nature.  
"Whatever is contrary to the order of reason is contrary to the nature of human beings as such; 
and what is reasonable is in accordance with human nature as such. The good of the human 
being is being in accord with reason, and human evil is being outside the order of 
reasonableness... So human virtue, which makes good both the human person and his works, is 
in accordance with human nature just in so far as it is in accordance with reason; and vice is 
contrary to human nature just in so far as it is contrary to the order of reasonableness" (ST, I-II, 
q.71, a.2c; cited in Buckle, 1993, 165). 
The development of the idea of natural rights in the jurisprudence and theology of the Medieval 
period is surveyed in Tuck (1979, 13-31). Important debates over the meaning of dominium and ius 
took place from the twelfth century onwards. These debates were often inextricably linked to the 
elaboration of canon law, and important theological debates - such as those between the 
Franciscan Monks and Pope John XXII - revolved around the meaning attributed to these rights-
based concepts in the 1320s. Ockham's Opus Nonaginta Dierum was published in response to 
these debates, and is cited by some modern authors - notably Villey - as the first work in which a 
modern theory of subjective rights can be identified. However, in Tuck's view, Gerson's description 
of ius as "a dispositional facultas or power, appropriate to someone and in accordance with the 
dictates of right reason", may have been the crucial turning point. For the first time, the concept of 
a right was understood in terms of an ability (1979, 22 &25-26). What is clear is that by the end of 
the Medieval period, important statements of the idea of prima facie rights had emerged from these jurisprudential and theological debates. This is the idea that was carried forward in theories of 
natural rights in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It suggested:  
"That men, considered purely as isolated individuals, had a control over their lives which could 
correctly be described as dominium or property. It was not a phenomenon of social intercourse, 
still less of civil law: it was a basic fact about human beings, on which their social and political 
relationships had to be posited" (Tuck, 1979, 24). 
The Early Modern period  
The ideas of natural law and natural rights continued to develop in the Early Modern period. As in 
previous periods, these ideas were invoked to promote and justify many different theories and 
agendas. Much of Reformation and Renaissance thought emphasised the sovereignty of individual 
conscience and humanism, and these ideas had a significant impact on thinking about natural law 
and natural rights. Yet as Vincent (1986, 23) notes, some of the thinkers of early Reformation, 
including Luther, invoked authorities such as St. Augustine and St Paul to enjoin the obedience of 
Christians to secular authorities, elaborating ideas that ultimately functioned to legitimise the 
absolute state.  
In his work on international law, the Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius focussed on the problem of 
how to develop a moral framework that can govern relations between modern nation states, 
suggesting that peaceful relations could be best maintained in an international system based on 
principles of natural law. These principles - with their basis in human nature and human rationality - 
could be accepted by all people everywhere, providing universal standards for evaluating the 
positive laws of all nation states, and for adjudicating international conflict. In elaborating this 
proposition, Grotius appealed to the ideas of secularism, suggesting that the principles of the law 
would have validity "even if we should concede ... that there is no God, or that the affairs of men 
are of no concern to Him" ([1624] 1925,13), and characterised the idea of an individual right as a 
capacity or power.  
" [Law can be characterised as] "a body of rights ... which has reference to the person. In this 
sense a right becomes a moral quality of a person, making it possible to have or to do something 
lawfully" ([1624] 1925, 35). 
The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes placed the idea of natural rights at the centre of a far-
reaching political theory. This theory suggested that individuals are endowed with natural rights 
that are independent of society - including the fundamental right to self-preservation. However, 
individuals in the state of nature cannot enforce their natural rights effectively. The state of nature 
is the natural condition of human existence that would obtain in the absence of government, in 
which people are equal and free. Therefore, in order to achieve the benefits of order and security, 
people voluntarily agree to submit to government. A social contract is arrived at whereby 
individuals transfer their natural rights to a sovereign power, and agree to submit to sovereign rule. 
This political theory is usually interpreted as justifying absolute and unlimited government. In 
contrast, Enlightenment thinkers elaborated theories that linked the ideas of natural rights, the state 
of nature and the social contract to far-reaching notions of limited government, popular sovereignty 
and accountability.  
1.3 The influence of the Enlightenment  
   It is often suggested that the modern idea of human rights is a direct descendent of the idea of 
liberal theories of natural rights that evolved in Western political thought from the Enlightenment 
period onwards. For example, Jones suggests that many people would use the terms “natural 
right” and “human right” interchangeably. “The idea of a human right remains that of a right which 
is ‘natural’ in that it is conceived as a moral entitlement which human beings posses in their 
natural capacity as humans, and not in virtue of any special arrangement into which they have 
entered or any particular system of law under whose jurisdiction they fall” (1991,223).  
The Enlightenment was an intellectual movement that swept across Britain, America and Europe in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Enlightenment thinkers are remembered for their 
emphasis on the ideas of science, reason and individualism over custom, tradition and authority. 
They shared a common view that beliefs and practices ought to be subjected to criticism and to the 
tests of reason and science, and ought not to be accepted on the basis of attachment, habit, 
prejudice, superstition, custom, tradition, authority or power. This view gave rise to deeply-
penetrating movements for change and reform that impacted on all areas of life, challenging 
traditional attachments, and transforming the outlooks of individuals, groups and societies. The 
view of rights as exclusive or limited privileges that rulers grant or bestow to individuals and groups 
was fundamentally challenged. In opposition to this view, Enlightenment thinkers elaborated 
theories that characterised rights in universal terms - as the birthright of all people, in virtue of their 
natural capacity as human beings. Theories of natural rights were increasingly invoked as a basis 
for protection against arbitrary state power, and to justify resistance to oppression. These theories 
became associated with new and revolutionary political ideas: with ideas of government 
responsibility, accountability and popular sovereignty; with the idea that all governments must 
derive their authority from the consent of the governed; and with the idea that government should 
be limited by fundamental rights to human life, liberty and well-being.  
John Locke: Natural rights, the social contract and the principle of consent  
   
Natural rights. Individuals are born free and equal and are endowed with natural rights in virtue 
of their common humanity.   
The social contract. Individuals come together to form governments in order to secure their 
natural rights more effectively. A social contract is formed between the government and the 
people to secure indivdual rights more effectively. The purpose of government is to protect 
individual rights.  
The principle of consent. Individuals do not give up their natural rights when they enter into the 
social contract. The legitimacy of government depends on the consent of the people.  
The three pivotal concepts in Locke's political theory are natural rights, the social contract, and the 
principle of consent.  
Locke introduced the idea of natural rights in relation to a "state of nature" - individuals are 
endowed with natural rights that are prior to, and independent of, the existence of a government. 
Previously, Hobbes had characterised the "state of nature" as a condition of "war of every man against every man" - a social state in which "(t)he notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice 
have there no place", and in which life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" ([1651] 1968, 
186-8). In contrast, Locke characterised the "state of nature" as a state of "perfect freedom", but 
not as a state of individual licence. Individuals are born free and equal and are endowed with 
natural rights to life, liberty and property. These natural rights are protected by "a law of nature ... 
which obliges everyone", and according to which "no one ought to harm another in his life, health, 
liberty or possessions". No one has the right to "take away or impair the life, or what tends to the 
preservation of the life, liberty, health, limb, or goods of another" and "every man hath a right to 
punish the offender and be executioner of the law of nature" (Locke, [1689/90] 1947,123-125). 
However, the protection of individual rights is imperfect in the Lockean "state of nature". Certain 
advantages - including impartiality and more effective enforcement - could be achieved through 
government and legislation. Hence Locke proposed that individuals come together and form an 
organised society in order to protect and promote their rights more effectively. A "social contract" is 
arrived at whereby individuals "give up their rights to interpret and execute natural law", consenting 
to obey government and laws, in return for the better protection and promotion of their rights.  
Significantly, Locke characterised the social contract as an outcome of free and voluntary individual 
action. Individuals form governments to achieve a specific purpose - the better protection of 
individual rights - and political power is based on the principle of consent. Previous philosophies 
had implied that individuals couldn't withdraw consent from a government without society itself 
being undermined. For example, Hobbes argued that although individuals retain certain rights 
under the terms of a social contract, social order depends on strong central government, and the 
natural right to liberty is transferred to the sovereign power. The implication of Hobbes' argument 
was that individuals do not have the right to withdraw their consent from a government. In contrast, 
Locke distinguished between the dissolution of society and the dissolution of government. 
Individual rights are prior to social obligation, and set the limits of civil obedience. In direct 
opposition to contemporary ideas of divine right of kings, hereditary and privilege, Locke argued 
that the power of governments is limited, not absolute. Individuals form a government for a specific 
purpose - the better protection of individual rights - and the legitimacy of government is contingent 
on its respect for individual rights. Individuals have the right to withdraw their consent and to 
dissolve a government that fails to honour the terms of the social contract. Individuals have a right 
to resist absolute and arbitrary power. If a government violates individual natural rights or exceeds 
the limits of its legitimate authority, resistance and rebellion are justified.  
   
“The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property; and the end why they 
choose and authorise a legislative is that there may be laws made and rules set as guards and 
fences to the properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power and moderate the 
dominion of every part and member of the society;” (II.222)  
“Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out 
of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent” (II.95).  
“Whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to 
reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power…the people … are thereupon absolved from any 
further obedience” (II.222).  “Whensoever, therefore, the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society, and 
either by ambition, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands 
of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people, by this breach 
of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it 
devolves to the people who have a right to resume their original liberty, and by the establishment 
of a new legislative, such as they shall think fit, provide for their own safety and security, which is 
the end for which they are in society” (II.222).  
(Locke, [1689-90] 1947) 
Locke also provided qualified support for the principles of liberty of conscience and religious 
tolerance. In An Essay Concerning Toleration, Locke argued that individuals have "absolute and 
universal right to toleration" in matters of religious worship ([1667] 1993a, 187). In A Letter 
Concerning Toleration ([1685] 1993b), Locke linked the idea of religious tolerance to that of social 
contract. Given the proposition that the function of government is to protect and promote individual 
rights, Locke further proposed that - with certain notable exceptions - matters of individual 
conscience, faith and religion be regarded as beyond the legitimate jurisdiction of the state.  
   
“No peace and security, no, not so much as common friendship, can ever be established or 
preserved amongst men, so long as this opinion prevails, that dominion is founded in grace, and 
that religion is to be propagated by force of arms”.   
“(N)o private person has any right, in any manner, to prejudice another person in his civil 
enjoyments because he is of another Church or religion”.   
“I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from 
that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other”.   
“These things being thus explained, it is easy to understand to what end the legislative power 
ought to be directed, and by what measures regulated; and that is the temporal good and outward 
prosperity of the society; which is the sole reason of men’s entering into society, and the only 
thing they seek and aim at in it. And it is also evident what liberty remains to men in reference to 
their eternal salvation, and that is, that everyone should do what he in his conscience is 
persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty ...”.   
(Locke, [1685] 1993b, 403, 400, 393, 423). 
Locke's characterisation of the "social contract" - together with the idea that individuals have 
natural rights that are prior to and independent of society - has been widely criticised in the modern 
literature. Taylor (1985a) has argued that defenders of the "doctrine of the primacy of rights" are 
forced to defend an "atomist" thesis, whereby human nature and the human condition are 
conceptualised in individualistic and self-sufficient terms.  
"The term "atomism" is used loosely to characterise the doctrines of social contract theory which 
arose in the seventeenth century and also successor doctrines which may not have made use of 
the notion of social contract but which inherited a vision of society as in some sense constituted 
by individuals for the fulfilment of ends which were primarily individual" (1985a, 187). In Taylor's view, "atomism" is easily undermined if it can be demonstrated that individuals cannot 
physically survive in isolation, and that characteristically human capacities can only be developed 
in the context of human society. For example, the development of human capacities may require 
identity and self-understanding and it is possible that these can only be acquired and sustained 
with others - through modes of common expression, understanding and recognition. Hence Taylor 
rejects the "atomist" thesis in favour of a "social" thesis, whereby living in a society is 
conceptualised as a necessary condition of the development of characteristically human capacities 
(1985a, 208-209). Furthermore, Taylor argues that the assertion of any rights-based claim entails 
an explicit or implicit claim relating to the value of human capacities. The implication is that rights-
based ethical theories cannot be independent of underlying theories of the human good or goods.  
"[A right] has an essential conceptual background, in some notion of the moral worth of certain 
properties or capacities, without which it would not make sense" (1985a, 195). "To believe that 
there is a right to independent moral convictions must be to believe that the exercise of the 
relevant capacity is a human good" (1985a, 198). 
Locke's work is often associated in the modern literature with a negative characterisation of 
freedom, and with the idea of an unlimited right to appropriation6. Yet other interpretations are 
possible. Some authors argue that Locke's theories reflect the idea of positive freedom as well as 
that of negative freedom - and the idea of economic and social rights as well as that of political and 
civil rights - providing solid foundations for modern theories of human rights7. For example, Locke 
characterises liberty as more than mere "license" and suggests that the purpose of law is not 
merely to "abolish" or "restrain" but "to preserve and enlarge freedom" ([1689/90]1947, II.57). In 
addition, Locke's characterisation of natural law is relatively broad - "no one ought to harm another 
in his life, health, liberty or possessions". Furthermore, although the idea of natural rights to 
individual possession and accumulation clearly play a central role within Locke's political theory, it 
is important to realise that Locke refers to a range of natural rights in the language of property. 
Indeed, Locke's analysis is consistent with, and supportive of, the idea that individuals have a 
property right in their own person or self, and relates to modern ideas of the notions of the 
inviolability of all human beings and self-ownership8. Finally, in emphasising the ideas of self-
preservation and the means to preservation, Locke seems to come close to justifying a natural right 
to subsistence.  
   
“(R)eason … teaches … that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in 
his life, health, liberty, or possessions” (II.6).  
“By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men 
have in their persons as well as goods” (II.173).  
“…(H)is property - that is, his life, liberty, and estate” (II.87).  
 “(H)e seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind 
to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general 
name ‘property’” (II.123).  
“Though the earth, and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property 
in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself” (II.27).   
“Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us that men, being once born, have a right to 
their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence; or revelation …; it is very clear that God … (has given) to mankind in common” 
(II.25).  
“(God) has given his needy brother a right to the surplusage of his goods, so that it cannot justly 
be denied him when his pressing wants call for it; and, therefore, no man could ever have a just 
power over the life of another by right of property in land or possessions, since it would always be 
a sin in any man of estate to let his brother perish for want of affording him relief out of his plenty. 
As justice gives every man a title to the product of his honest industry and the fair acquisitions of 
his ancestors descended to him, so charity gives every man a title to so much out of another’s  
plenty as will keep him from extreme want where he has no means to subsist otherwise. And a 
man can no more justly make use of another’s necessity to force him to become his vassal by 
withholding that relief God requires him to afford to the wants of his brother, than he that has 
more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to his obedience, and …. offer him death or 
slavery”  (I.42).  Source: (Locke [1689/90] 1947).  
Clearly, Locke was not a human rights advocate in the modern sense. Locke seems to have 
characterised right-bearers as male property holders, and excluded Catholics, religious groups with 
"foreign" political allegiances and atheists from the domain of tolerance. Moreover, Locke is widely 
cited as a beneficiary of the slave trade. Nevertheless, many of his arguments had a profound 
impact on claims for fundamental freedoms and rights, and on theories of religious tolerance, as 
they developed in England and America, and remain highly influential today.  
Paine and the Rights of Man  
Thomas Paine was an influential proponent of ideas of natural rights, freedom and national 
independence. Paine's Common Sense ([1776] 1967) and The Rights of Man ([1791/2] 1969) had 
an important and enduring influence by providing a theoretical justification for American 
Independence and the French Revolution. His political influence was based on his advocacy of 
three central principles.  
   
Tom Paine on universal principles and the Rights of Man  
-  Individuals are born and continue to be free and equal in respect of their rights.   
-  The end of all political associations is the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These   
natural rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppression.   
-  Sovereignty is not vested in any privileged group or individual but is vested in the nation. No 
individual or organisation is entitled to any authority that is not expressly derived from the nation.   
(Paine, [1791/2] 1969, 166) 
Paine elaborated theoretical foundations for these principles based on the idea of a "social 
contract" between a government and people. Individuals are born with natural rights that are 
independent of and prior to government, and are derived from common humanity. However, 
individuals do not have the power to perfectly execute and secure all of their natural rights, and 
they come together voluntarily to form political associations with the aim of securing their natural 
rights more effectively. In addition, Paine argued - with Locke and against Hobbes - that in forming a political association and consenting to government, individuals do not renounce or give up their 
natural rights. These natural rights are imprescriptible and are vested in the "common stock" of 
society on the basis of trust. In Paine's view, "Man did not enter into society to become worse than 
he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have those rights better 
secured". Therefore, sovereignty resides not in the political organisation, but in the nation. 
Government should be based on consent, and individuals retain the "right to resist" when the terms 
of the social contract are broken.  
Paine was a pamphleteer and polemicist and applied the theory of natural rights to far-reaching 
arguments on the crucial issues of the day. These included arguments against hereditary and 
monarchical systems of government, foreign domination, taxation without representation, and 
slavery; and arguments for popular sovereignty, constitutional and representative government, the 
principle of consent and the right to resist, universal male suffrage, national independence, 
tolerance and religious freedom. In addition, Paine highlighted the relationship between "the rights 
of man" and poverty, and advanced arguments for economic and social rights. In Paine's view, a 
lack of respect for individual rights and the absence of representative government can result in 
adverse policies that disproportionately affect the poor - such as unfair taxes on essential 
consumption goods and rules that artificially depress wages. In contrast, securing the rights of man 
and representative government can provide a basis for the redistribution of the burden of taxation, 
and pro-poor policies such as poor relief, state education for poor children, and old age pensions9.  
The German Enlightenment: Kant's argument for universal moral principles  
The contemporary idea of human rights reflects a hope and commitment to the idea that it is 
possible to identify universal moral principles relating to the treatment of all people. Some human 
rights thinkers believe that principles of this type are based on religion and conscience. Others 
argue that these universal moral principles are not only what conscience might demand, and what 
religions might teach, but that these principles can be deduced from the application of human 
reason. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant was committed to this idea. Inspired by the 
Enlightenment ideas of reason and science, Kant attempted to formulate a foundational principle of 
morality - a first principle (or "law") of ethics from which all other valid ethical principles can be 
derived - on the basis of human reason alone.  
   
Key elements of Kant’s argument   
Freedom and autonomy. Individuals are free in the sense that they are not forced to act in 
accordance with their personal desires, happiness or self-interest. They can act autonomously, in 
accordance with principles of reason. They can choose to act in accordance with universal moral 
principles.  
Universal moral principles. These can be identified on the basis of reason alone. Individuals 
can undertake a thought experiment, abstracting from their own personal desires and interests, 
and identifying those maxims that would be freely adopted by all individuals in the same position. 
Maxims of this type can be said to satisfy the condition of universalism.  
Consistency and impartiality. Maxims that satisfy the condition of universalism are consistent in form. They apply to all individuals on an equal basis without exception. They exclude the 
possibility of privilege and bias, and establish an impartial perspective for moral affairs.   
Unconditional moral obligations.  Maxims that satisfy the condition of universalism embody the 
categorical ought. They are not matters of individual preference, but are "necessitated" and 
"commanded" by the principles of reason. They give rise to unconditional moral obligations that all 
individuals ought to obey.   
The categorical imperative. The “supreme” moral obligation is the categorical imperative: "I 
ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a 
universal law". This first formulation implies universalism, consistency and impartiality.  
Respect for the dignity of all human persons. A second formulation of the categorical 
imperative states: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end". 
This second formulation implies that no individual ought to be treated arbitrarily, as a means to an 
end.  Individuals are intrinsically valuable, and the dignity and worth of all human persons ought to 
be respected.   
Internationalism. Universal moral principles are not limited by geographic location or national 
boundaries.  There is a need for international political institutions that are not driven by national 
interests and that reflect the universal nature of the human condition. The ideal of a “league of 
nations” would help to create the conditions for “perpetual peace”.   
Sources: Kant ([1785] 1991, 67, 91) and ([1795] 1983).  
The influence of Kant's ethics on subsequent theories of rights and human rights has proved 
enduring. The question of whether or not it is possible to arrive at an objective perspective has 
been a constant subject in the history of Western thought since Plato and Aristotle. As O'Neill 
(1993) points out, Kant introduced a new dimension to this debate, by rejecting the realist and 
theological framework within which theories of natural law and accounts of the virtues had 
previously been developed, and by not relying on subjective conceptions of the good, desires, 
preferences etc. In addressing the question What should I do? Kant proposed that it is possible to 
construct an impartial moral perspective in ethics by abstracting from everything but the fact of a 
person's rational agency. Despite many criticisms in the modern literature (relativist, subjectivist, 
communitarian etc), this proposition is central to many debates in modern political theory, and 
continues to inform and inspire influential contemporary thinkers such as Rawls (1973) and Barry 
(1995). More generally, Kant's proposition that individuals ought never to be treated as means to 
an end is at the heart of many modern rights-based ethical theories. As Scruton (1982, 72) notes, 
this idea "imposes a universal duty to respect the rights and interests of others, and a rational 
requirement to abstract from personal involvement towards the viewpoint of the impartial judge".  
Although Nozick (1974) interprets the principle of respect in terms of negative obligations or side-
constraints, the principle of respect can be interpreted as giving rise to positive obligations to 
assist, as well as negative obligations of constraint. Authority for this interpretation include the 
following passages:  
"Now humanity could no doubt subsist if everybody contributed nothing to the happiness of others 
but at the same time refrained from deliberately impairing their happiness. This is, however, merely to agree negatively and not positively with humanity as an end in itself unless everyone 
endeavours also, so far as in him lies, to further the ends of others. For the ends of a subject who 
is an end in himself must, if this conception is to have its full effect in me, be also, as far as 
possible, my ends" (Kant, 1991, 92).  
"[Consider the case of a man who] is himself flourishing, but he sees others who have to struggle 
with great hardships (and whom he could easily help); and he thinks 'What does it matter to me? 
... [A]lthough it is possible that a universal law of nature could subsist in harmony with this maxim, 
yet it is impossible to will that such a principle should hold ..." (Kant, 1991, 86). 
Plant (1991, 207-209) notes that authors have cited these passages as authority for the idea of 
universal obligations to fulfil basic human needs, and suggests that this interpretation probably 
goes beyond the text. Furthermore, these passages should be interpreted in the context of Kant's 
distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations. Nevertheless, there is clear authority for the 
positive as well as the negative interpretation of the principle of respect for persons in Kant's 
writings, and this principle - as well as the related idea that individuals are of intrinsic value and 
worth - are at the heart of contemporary theories of the inviolability of human rights. Indeed, Kant's 
theories are often cited as the reason for the inclusion of the term "dignity" in the Preamble to the 
Universal Declaration.  
The French Enlightenment: Natural law and natural rights  
The ideas of natural law, natural rights and universalism were further developed in eighteenth 
century France and provided the intellectual background to - and many of the theoretical 
justifications for - the French Revolution. Writers of the French Enlightenement often invoked these 
ideas as a basis for challenging positive laws that were widely regarded as unjust. For example, 
Diderot was the editor of the infamous Encyclopedia - a body of work that that introduced new 
ideas about reason and science, and challenged many of the orthodox views about the nature and 
origins of power and authority - and which was published despite many attempts at control and 
censure. Diderot's (1755) Encyclopedia entry on the subject of natural law was written in direct 
opposition to ideas of divine right, hierarchy and privilege. It suggested that a person has no "true, 
inalienable natural rights" apart from "those of humanity", and that the ideas of natural law and 
natural rights are characterised by a fundamental equality, implying that "the laws should be made 
for everyone, and not for one person" [cited in Hunt (1996, 37)]. Similarly, Voltaire's Treatise on 
Toleration (1763) defended the individual right to practice religion without fear of persecution. 
According to Voltaire, principles of universalism can be identified in many different religions and 
cultures from around the world and a "great principle" of natural law- that guards against 
intolerance and guarantees freedom of conscience - should be reflected in human law.  
"All over the earth the great principle ... is: Do not unto others what you would that they do not 
unto you ... (I)n virtue of this principle, one man cannot say to another ... 'Believe, or I detest thee; 
believe, or I will do thee all the harm I can'" [cited in Hunt (1996, 39-40)]. 
Rousseau's The Social Contract [1762 (1993)] provided the theoretical basis for many of the ideas 
of the French Enlightenment. Like Locke, Rousseau rejected Hobbes' characterisation of the idea 
of social contract, challenging the view that human liberty and natural rights are alienable, and 
rejecting the proposition that individuals have a duty of passive obedience to the government that 
they agree to set up. However, although Locke developed a theoretical justification for rebellion if a 
government violated the terms of the social contract, he did not provide for any machinery, short of revolution, for the expression of popular opinion and for establishing popular consent. In contrast, 
the institution of a citizens assembly is central to Rousseau's scheme, and Rousseau's 
characterisation of the social contract provides for the expression of opinion and consent by the 
people through the exercise of democratic rights (Cole, 1993, 357). Yet a citizens assembly is, for 
Rousseau, far more than a vehicle for majority rule. In Rousseau's view, when individuals freely 
come together to participate in a citizens assembly, they can transcend their individual private 
interests, and legislate according to purely rational principles that reflect common and general 
interests. Legislation of this type, he suggests, takes the form of general (universal) rules that bind 
all individuals equally without exception and reflects the "general will" - where the term "general" 
refers not simply to a "will held by several persons", but to a "will having a general (universal) 
object" (Cole, 1993, 380). Furthermore, Rousseau contends that a social arrangement of this type 
is compatible with individual freedom. The people share sovereign authority collectively, and this 
authority is inalienable and indivisible [1762 (1993, 192, 199-207)].  
Rousseau's ideas have been variously interpreted in modern political theory. Some authors have 
suggested that Rousseau's political theory is inconsistent and that his theory of individual rights is 
defective. They have linked the idea of the "general will" to that of "totalitarian democracy" and to 
cruel violations of human rights that occurred during the French Revolution. Rousseau has also 
been widely criticised for defending the exclusion of women from political life (Ryan, 1993, xiv-
v&xxii). Others, however, have championed Rousseau as an advocate of individual liberty, 
characterising his proclamation that "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains" [1762 
(1993, 181)] as an influential challenge to arbitrary, despotic and absolute government, and as a 
key landmark in the political and intellectual development of the idea of human rights.  
1.4 Declarations and assertions of rights and liberties in the political movements and 
revolutions of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries  
   
Nelson Mandela on the historical origins of the idea of human rights 
“Between 1912 and the mid-1940s, the period during which I entered national politics, the world 
experienced two devastating world wars. As a direct consequence, the political value system with 
which the ANC identified changed and was greatly expanded. Few will dispute that the political 
culture of human rights, which underwent its severest test during the course of this century, was 
greatly enriched by the war against fascism. Equally important was the contribution made by the 
colonial peoples after 1945, in their struggle for independence. This culture of human rights is 
rooted in and inextricably linked to the political revolutions of the late eighteenth century and 
those that took place during the mid-nineteenth century. It was adopted by humanity as its 
common heritage in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights after the Second World War”.   
[Mandela (1991, 75-78)]. 
Declarations and assertions of rights in the English tradition  
Declarations and assertions of liberties and rights in England from the Medieval period onwards 
reflected the idea that the power of the sovereign ought to be limited by "ancient liberties and 
rights". These declarations and assertions were often based on appeals to the traditions of 
common law liberties and the rule of law, and challenged deeply-rooted ideas of the divine right of kings and of unlimited sovereignty. The Magna Carta (1215) was conceded by King John, and is 
widely interpreted as embodying the central principles of due process. Declarations of liberties and 
rights were also highly influential in the debates and power struggles between Parliament and the 
Crown in the seventeenth century. These included The Petition of Right (1628), The Habeas 
Corpus Amendment Act (1679), and The English Bill of Rights (1689). Although these 
constitutional and legal innovations are a far-cry from the modern idea of human rights, they were 
nevertheless influential early models. They had a profound influence on ideas of liberty, rights, 
freedom, national independence, responsibility, sovereignty and accountability as they developed 
in Europe and the Americas in the late-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries.  
   
The English tradition of common law liberties and the rule of law  
. The Magna Carta (1215). This document was acceded to by King John after rebellion by barons 
in response to feudal grievances, condemning arbitrary judgements and abuses of power, 
guaranteeing the liberty of the church, and listing the “liberties, rights and concessions” of 
freemen that ought not to be violated. The symbolic significance of this document is embodied in 
the principle that “no freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or deprived of his freehold, 
or outlawed, or banished … unless by the lawful judgement of his peers and by the law of the 
land”. This clause is widely interpreted as embodying the central principles of the idea of due 
process.   
. The Petition of Right (1628). This document “Concerning divers rights and liberties of the 
subjects”   
reflected the idea that a sovereign could be justifiably overthrown for transgressions, responds to 
particular grievances, and asserts the importance of certain principles, including that of 
parliamentary consent, and that there should be no imprisonment or detention without cause. 
Although the Petition was acceded to by King Charles I, the period of personal rule that ensued 
culminated in the outbreak of Civil War.  
. The Habeas Corpus Amendment Act (1679). The writ of Habeas Corpus protected the rights 
and liberty of individuals by ensuring that the law courts could order individuals who had been 
imprisoned or detained to come before them in person, so that their case could be examined. 
However, a number of methods had been introduced to deprive political prisoners of the benefits 
of this writ. Following the restoration of Charles II (1660), The Habeas Corpus Amendment Act 
declared these methods illegal.   
. The English Bill of Rights (1689) began with a complaint against violations of rights by King 
James II for going beyond his powers, and for violating ancient “liberties” and “rights” that ought 
never to be transgressed by the sovereign, including those of freedom of speech and 
parliamentary consent. The Bill of Rights reflected the ancient idea of liberties and rights, rather 
than the modern idea of universal human rights. Nevertheless, the Bill of Rights was central to the 
Constitutional Settlement associated with the Glorious Revolution (1688), the exile of James II, 
and the inauguration of William and Mary, and represents a crucial landmark in the political 
transformation of England from an unlimited to a constitutional monarchy.  It vindicated the 
liberties and rights of the people, the principle of parliamentary control and the limitations of the 
power of the sovereign.   
. The Toleration Act (1689). This Act achieved limited religious tolerance for Protestant 
dissenters. 
Declarations of rights in the political revolutions of the late-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries  
Whereas the English declarations of liberties and rights were based on appeals to common law 
liberties and the rule of law, the declarations of rights associated with American Independence and the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century assumed a more universal form. These 
declarations of rights appealed not to the legal traditions and customs of a particular country, but to 
the ideas of a universal law and natural rights. It is true that human rights were often violently and 
cruelly violated during this period of history, and that the declarations of rights of this period fell far 
short of the standards embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and modern 
international law. Important groups - including native Americans, slaves, women - were excluded 
from the benefits of the "natural rights of man". Yet the American Declaration of Independence and 
Bill of Rights, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen provided a new basis for 
the demands of excluded groups. The principles of universalism reflected in these early models 
inspired individuals, transformed societies and shaped subsequent ideas of human rights.  
   
The American Declaration of Independence (1776) and Bill of Rights (1789)  
The American Declaration of Independence (1776) was born of the experience of colonial 
misrule. The main architect of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson, was inspired by John Locke’s 
theoretical justification of rebellion in terms of “natural rights”. The Declaration details the ways in 
which the abuse of power by King George III transgressed these principles and states:   
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of 
Happiness. That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their 
just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes 
destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organising its Powers in such Form, as 
to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness” (Declaration of 
Independence, 1776). 
This declaration of inalienable rights of individuals provided the philosophical foundations for the 
individual rights recognised in the US Constitution (1789) and the Bill of Rights. The latter 
(comprising the first ten amendments to the Constitution) affirms freedom of religion, of speech, of 
the press, of peaceful assembly and of petition; the right of people to security in their homes and 
to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizure”; the right to property; the rights to trial by 
jury, to due process, and to a speedy and impartial trial; and rights against self-incrimination and 
double jeopardy. Nevertheless, the standards set by the US Constitution and the Bill of Rights fell 
far short of modern international human rights standards, particularly in the following areas:  
 . The exclusion of slaves. There were many demands for the abolition of slavery at the time of 
the passage of the US Constitution and the Bill of Rights. For example, in 1775, Thomas Paine 
wrote:   
“Is the barbarous enslaving of our inoffensive neighbours ... reconcilable with ... Divine precepts?  
Is this doing to them as we would desire they should do to us? ... As these people are not 
convicted of forfeiting freedom, they have still a natural, perfect right to it; and the governments, 
whenever they come, should, in justice set them free, and punish those who hold them in slavery. 
... These are the sentiments of JUSTICE AND HUMANITY”  [cited in Ishay (1997, 131-2)]. 
Nevertheless, slavery was not formally abolished until 1865, by the XIIIth Amendment.   
. Racial discrimination.  Universal male suffrage was not achieved until 1870, when the XVth 
Amendment stated that the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude.   
 . The exclusion of women. The vote was not extended to all women until the adoption of the 
XIXth Amendment in 1920. Women did not react passively to their exclusion. For example, in 
1873, Susan B. Anthony, a strong advocate of women’s suffrage, argued that the “blessings of 
liberty” being withheld from women violated the principles of universality recognised in the US 
Constitution.   
“The preamble of the Federal Constitution says: ‘We, the people of the United States ...’. It was 
we, the people; not we, the white male citizens; … The only question left to be settled now is: Are 
women persons? And I hardly believe any of our opponents will ... say they are not. Being 
persons, then, women are citizens; and no state has a right to make any law, or to enforce any 
old law, that shall abridge their privileges or immunities. Hence, every discrimination against 
women in the constitutions and laws of the several states is today null and void, precisely as is 
every one against Negroes” [cited in Collins (1998, 340)].  
In France, the ideals and principles of the Revolution were marred by the violation of human rights 
during the subsequent "Terror". Nevertheless, the break with traditional ideas of the absolute rule 
of kings and divine right, and of privilege, rank and hierarchy, inaugurated a new period in human 
history. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) recognised fundamental 
individual rights and freedoms, and declared these to be the basis of government. The Declaration 
unleashed an unprecedented debate about the nature and scope of human rights. New ideas and 
movements relating to the rights of free black people, the abolition of slavery, economic and social 
rights, the position of women, national independence and the idea of self-determination, were born 
and established in this period.  
   
The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789)  
The French Revolution began with a complaint about the exercise of arbitrary powers and 
violations of rights by Louis XVI. In opposition to ideas of divine right, monarchy and hierarchy, 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen asserted the “natural, inalienable, and 
sacred rights of man” that ought to be respected by government. Article 2 states:   
 “The aim of every political association is the preservation of the natural and inalienable rights of 
man; these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression” [cited in Ishay 
(1997, 138)].   
The Declaration proceeds to affirm a range of individual rights including freedom of speech, 
opinion, publication; the right to property; the rule of law and the right to the assumption of 
innocence; and the principle that taxation should be on the basis of representation and consent. 
The French Revolution is also remembered for unleashing a period of unprecedented debates 
about the nature and scope of human rights.  
. Demands for tolerance and rights for Calvinists and Jews. The Edict of Toleration (1787) 
extended certain civil rights - including the right to religious freedom - to Calvinists. Citizenship 
rights were extended to all Jews in 1791.  
. Demands for the abolition of slavery. The French Revolution intensified anti-slavery opinion in France. Demands for the abolition of slavery and the slave trade were often founded on theories 
of natural law and natural rights. The National Assembly declared the abolition of slavery in all the 
French Colonies in 1794.  
. Demands for economic and social rights. Demands for human rights articulated in the French 
Revolution included demands for economic and social rights.   
“Public assistance is a sacred obligation. Society owes subsistence to unfortunate citizens, 
whether in finding work for them, or in assuring the means of survival of those incapable of 
working”. Article XXI of the revised Declaration of June 1793 [cited in Davies (1997,714)].  
. Demands for the equal rights of women. The revolutionary period witnessed many demands 
for the rights of women, and in 1790, Olympe de Gouge issued The Declaration of the Rights of 
Women. The Preamble states:   
“Mothers, daughters, sisters [and] representatives of the nation demand to be constituted into a 
national assembly. Believing that ignorance, omission, or scorn for the rights of woman are the 
only cause of public misfortunes and of the corruption of governments, [the women] have 
resolved to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural inalienable, and sacred rights of woman in 
order that this declaration constantly exposed before all the members of society, will ceaselessly 
remind them of their rights and duties …” [cited in Ishay (1997, 141-2)]. 
Like many other revolutionaries, however, Olympe de Gouge was executed. Women’s Clubs were 
suppressed, and claims for women’s equality were rejected during the period of turmoil and terror 
following the French Revolution. The influence of demands for women’s rights during the period of 
the French Revolution were reflected in Mary Wollstonecraft’s The Rights of Woman ([1792] 
1992). 
International movements for freedom and national independence  
The French Revolution marked the political transformation of Europe, and inspired and precipitated 
movements for freedom and independence around the world. In the French colony of Saint 
Dominique, Vincent Ogé, a mulatto slave-owner, demanded political and civil rights for mulattos, 
and that mulatto members be represented in the National Assembly in Paris.  
"This Freedom, the greatest, the first of goods, is it made for all men? I believe so. Should it be 
given to all men? I believe so again" (Statement by Vincent Ogé to the Assembly of Colonists, 
1789: Hunt, 1996, 103-4). 
When his demands were not met, Ogé led an insurrection in Saint Dominique, and he was 
ultimately executed for leading a mulatto rebellion. Nevertheless, a slave revolt in 1791 resulted in 
the rise of a black leader, Toussaint l'Ouverture, who virtually achieved independence from colonial 
rule. The independent republic of Haiti was created in 1804, and l'Ouverture is widely cited as 
heading the only successful slave revolution in history.  
Many of the mid-nineteenth century movements for national independence were inspired by the 
slogan of "liberty, equality and fraternity". The Enlightenment ideas of universalism, freedom and 
natural rights helped to generate new ideas of national liberation, self-government and self-
determination, providing the theoretical justification for challenges to monarchic, foreign and 
colonial rule. In 1848 a wave of movements for freedom and national independence across Europe 
culminated in nationalist revolts in many different countries - including Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Hungary and Norway. The impact of the French Revolution was also felt in Latin 
America. Hostility to colonial rule and hope of independence inspired by the French Revolution was 
reflected in the escalating movements for national independence and self-determination. Simón 
Bolívar - known as "The Liberator" for his role in the independence struggles in Venezuela, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia - was a passionate advocate for the freedom of slaves, and is 
remembered for linking the ideas of nationalism and freedom to those of economic independence 
and human rights. For Bolívar, both the exclusion of Americans from positions of office and 
participation, and the domination of the economy by colonial power, were human rights issues.  
   
“I plead with you to confirm the complete freedom of the slaves as I would plead for my life, or for 
the life of the Republic” [Simón Bolívar, 1819; cited in UNESCO (1969, 167)].  
“Our condition was so negative that I find no parallel in any other civilised group, however much I 
review the ages and politics of all nations. To claim that a country so fortunately constituted, large, 
rich and populous, should be purely passive, is that not an infringement, a violation of human 
rights?” [Simón Bolívar, 1815; cited in UNESCO (1969, 488)]. 
These important movements for freedom, national independence and human rights influenced the 
Indian struggle for national independence and the wave of de-colonisation and national 
independence after World War Two. The right to self-determination was recognised in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), the Charter of the United Nations (1945), the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and key international human rights treaties. Ideas about the 
links between human rights issues and issues of economic independence have subsequently 
influenced the development of the concept of an "international economic order" in which rights can 
be achieved, and the concept of the "human right to development".  
2. RESPONDING TO THE RELATIVIST CRITIQUE: SOME POINTS OF DEPARTURE  
2.1 The nature and scope of the relativist critique  
The relativist critique central to contemporary thinking about human rights. As indicated in Section 
1.1, an ethical debate between advocates of universalism and advocates of relativism has ensued 
for more than 2000 years. This debate is a vast and complex terrain in which the contours of 
disagreement and debate often prove to be the slip-roads of theoretical debates in other 
disciplines, including psychology, anthropology, sociology and political theory. In general, 
universalists defend the possibility of objective ethical knowledge, proposing that it is possible to 
discover, to deduce or to construct objective ethical standards, and that such standards have 
universal implications in virtue of their impartiality and neutrality. Relativists disagree, denying that 
it is possible to arrive at objective ethical standards, and proposing that, as a consequence, ethical 
standards are particular and contingent, rather than universal and absolute. The ensuing debate 
addresses the role of reason and abstraction on the one hand, and of the empirical observation of 
existing norms and practices on the other, in the formulation of ethical standards. Whereas 
universalists emphasize the role of abstract ethical categories such as human rights in the 
determination of ethical belief, relativists adopt an empirical approach, highlighting the significance 
of causal variables such as psychological desires, preferences and emotions; historical, social and cultural context; and group interests, power and ideology. For example, one influential critique of 
universalism suggests that ethical statements are not reasoned judgements made on the basis of 
rational choices, but are subjective statements reflecting individual preferences, hopes and 
emotions. This critique is associated with a range of ideas and political agendas - including those 
of subjectivism, emotivism, logical positivism, value pluralism and political liberalism. Another 
critique suggests that claims of universality and objectivity conceal underlying ideologies and 
power relations. Again, this critique is associated with a range of ideas and political agendas - 
including those of Marxism, existentialism and postmodernism. Yet another critique emphasises 
that there is no way of ranking social meanings or human needs, and that ethical values and 
practices can only be understood in terms of the ways of life of particular groups. This critique is 
associated with communitarian philosophy10.  
Modern anthropology has informed and contributed to the universalism-relativism debate by 
highlighting the diversity of ethical categories - and of the interpretation, significance and functions 
of diverse ethical categories - in different cultures, societies and historical periods. In the field of 
human rights, the absence and presence of the ethical categories "rights" and "obligations" - as 
well as the interpretation, significance and functions of these ethical categories - has been widely 
analysed. It is often suggested that the modern concept of human rights - with its emphasis on the 
individual as a basic unit of society - is absent from traditional societies. For example, Wilson 
(1997, 6) suggests that the conception of an individual "human being" may be incomprehensible in 
some cultural contexts, and points out that American-Indian languages such as Navajo and Hopi 
construct the concept of "humanness" as belonging solely to those within the boundaries of the 
community. Outsiders are perceived to be non-human to a certain degree, particularly in origin 
myths. Pollis (1996) suggests that while different traditional belief systems are associated with 
diverse forms of group identity - for instance, identity with kin, the clan or the tribe - in all traditional 
societies, the human person is defined by group, rather than individual, identity. Cobbah (1987, 
321-322) proposes that the basic unit of traditional African society is the extended family rather 
than the individual, and that traditional African philosophy characterises the category of an 
individual human person in the context of his or her community and culture. In Cobbah's view, the 
concept of rights and obligations in traditional African societies should be conceptualised not in 
terms of individual autonomy, but as organising principles regulating kinship roles and extended 
family ties. Legesse (1980, 124-7) proposes that a critical difference between African and Western 
traditions concerns the importance of the human individual. Whereas in Western liberal 
democracies the human person is in a paramount position as the "ultimate repository of rights", 
Legesse implies that an over-riding concern with individual "worth, personal autonomy, and 
property" is absent from many African traditions and cultures.  
As well as highlighting the importance of the empirical observation of diversity and difference in the 
world, influential theoretical and methodological approaches in modern anthropology have had a 
significant impact on thinking about universalism and relativism. Many anthropologists have 
inferred from the empirical observation of diversity and difference in the world the view that ethical 
values ought only to be evaluated in terms of their particular cultural context. According to this 
approach, external evaluation of ethical ideals is neither possible nor desirable. It is not possible 
because ethical categories are contingent and particular - rather than universal and absolute - and 
there is no "trans-cultural truth" or "rationality" on the basis of which contending ethical claims could 
be made commensurate and be evaluated. It is not desirable because it inevitably involves the imposition of one value system upon another, and is inextricably linked with systems of ideology, 
dominance and power. For example, according to Melville Herskovits:  
"[C]ultural relativism is a philosophy which, in recognizing the values set by every society to guide 
its own life, lays stress on the dignity inherent in every body of custom, and on the need for 
tolerance of conventions though they may different from one's own ... [T]he relativistic point of 
view brings into relief the validity of every set of norms for the people whose lives are guided by 
them, and the values these represent" (1948, 76). 
Herskovits defends the idea of cultural relativism in terms of the scientific principles of 
independence and objectivity, as well as the ethical value of tolerance. Given the proposition that 
"... evaluations are relative to the cultural background out of which they arise", he suggests that 
cultural relativism could overcome methodological biases arising from "enculturation" (the 
psychological and social processes whereby cultural practices and norms are learnt and adopted) 
and "ethnocentricism" (the tendency of individuals and groups to view their own ways of life as 
preferable) (1948, 63-68)11. This approach has been highly influential, with the principle that 
information should be interpreted in a culturally relativistic way - in the terms of the society and 
context in which it occurs - being widely associated with scientific principles of neutrality, 
detachment and rigor, and considerable emphasis being placed on the importance of a neutral, 
non-judgmental and non-interventionist approach [Silberbauer (1993, 16) and Renteln (1990, 76-
77)]. Cultural relativism in anthropology is also associated with a rejection of the cross-cultural 
validity of international human rights norms. Many authors have argued that the idea of human 
rights - far from being universal - is culturally specific and historically contingent, and is, in effect, a 
"Western bias". The paradigmatic expression of this view was elaborated by the Executive Board 
of the American Anthropological Association, in a response to the preparation of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations. This stated that:  
"Respect for differences between cultures is validated by the scientific fact that no technique of 
qualitatively evaluating cultures has been discovered ... Standards and values are relative to the 
culture from which they derive so that any attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the 
beliefs or moral codes of one culture must to that extent detract from the applicability of any 
Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as a whole ... The rights of Man in the Twentieth 
Century cannot be circumscribed by the standards of any single culture, or be dictated by the 
aspirations of any single people" (1947, 542-3). 
The characterisation of the dominant idea of human rights as a "Western bias" has become 
commonplace in the contemporary literature on culture and human rights. For example, for Pollis 
and Schwab, the dominant idea of human rights is "A Western construct with limited applicability" 
(1979, 1-18). The association between ideas about human rights and power is also a re-occurring 
theme in accounts of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, of East-West relations during 
the Cold War, and of North-South relations today. For example, Chomsky and Herman (1979) 
analyse the role of human rights ideology in legitimizing North-South imperialism and neo-
colonialism on the one hand, and in concealing and disguising the contrary practices of imperialist 
powers on the other, while Shivji (1989) suggests that the role of human rights ideology has 
functioned to perpetuate colonial and neo-colonial domination and oppression in Africa.  
The critique of universalism has become highly politicised in recent years. The culture-based 
critique of the idea of universal human rights gained ground at the World Conference on Human 
Rights, convened in Vienna in 1993, and became closely associated with the promotion of certain 
political agendas. At the preparatory meetings that preceded this Conference, the negotiating 
positions of certain East Asian countries - including Malaysia, China and Singapore - raised the 
spectre of culture-based exemptions to modern international human rights standards. In the event, neither the Bangkok Declaration (1993) nor the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
(1993) provide authority for the idea of culture-based exemptions to international human rights 
standards12. Nevertheless, the impression was conveyed of a fundamental North-South division 
on the issue of universalism versus cultural relativism. These events have had a significant impact 
on contemporary thinking about the cross-cultural foundations of human rights. Some of the 
important responses to the relativist critique that have emerged in the literature are surveyed in the 
sub-sections that follow. Criticisms of relativism are considered and new conceptual frameworks - 
in which the cross-cultural foundations of the modern idea of human rights can be taken more 
seriously - are briefly described.  
2.2 Responding to relativism  
The idea of "contested cultures"  
The concept of culture that underlies relativist challenges to the idea of human rights has itself 
been widely criticised. For example, Barry (1995,4-5) questions approaches that claim to derive 
conclusions from the allegedly shared values of a society. He suggests that the picture of the world 
that sustains the anti-universalist programme is an inaccurate one, in which societies are assumed 
to have distinct, homogeneous and coherent sets of political beliefs. Preis (1996, 289) is also 
critical of "essentializing" concepts that define culture in terms of static, homogeneous, bounded 
units and consistent sets of values, neglecting the possible conflicts and contradictions within 
cultures and societies. Bunting (1993, 8-9, 14) notes that cultural relativism presumes that all 
members of society will benefit equally from society, and that the question of which groups in 
society have the power to constitute dominant cultural norms is rarely discussed. Ranger (1983) 
and Messer (1993, 234) suggest that customs that are represented in terms of "tradition" can 
sometimes have neither great historical depth nor great cultural importance, and may benefit 
certain privileged categories of individuals, such as males, or those in power. The use of cultural 
relativism as an instrument of state power, as well as the potential conflict between relativism and 
the human rights of women - including the use of tradition and culture to perpetuate and legitimise 
discrimination - have also been widely discussed in this context13. These analyses challenge 
many of the assumptions on which cultural relativism is premised, and suggest an alternative 
approach, that characterises different cultures in terms of their plural, dynamic, diverse and 
contradictory elements.  
The need for more adequate "cross-cultural foundations"  
At the same time, the relativist critique has given rise to a new appreciation of the need for greater 
cultural sensitivity, including the need to develop more adequate cross-cultural foundations for the 
idea of human rights. It is evident that no cross-cultural understanding and meaning of the idea of 
human rights can be assumed, and approaches that locate the historical roots of the idea of human 
rights exclusively in terms of the ideas of natural law and natural rights as they have evolved in 
Western political thought are increasingly being rejected. Such approaches are historically and 
ethically limited, and leave the idea of human rights exposed to the charge of Western imperialism. 
In recent years, there has been an attempt to respond to the relativist critique by broadening out 
the debate, and by demonstrating that ideas of natural law and natural rights do not provide 
exclusive foundations for the idea of human rights. Particular emphasis is placed on the need to establish a cross-cultural and inter-faith dialogue in order to identify shared beliefs and principles 
that can provide a consensual basis for international human rights standards. Whereas relativists 
tend to characterise the idea of human rights as being absent from, and alien to, the traditions and 
practices of many non-Western societies, human rights thinkers and activists have emphasised 
that the traditions from which the idea of human rights has emerged - traditions of universalism, 
tolerance and respect for human dignity and worth, traditions of freedom, traditions of concern for 
the poor, needy and exploited, and traditions of interpersonal obligation and government 
responsibility - have not emerged exclusively in or from any single cultural tradition. No particular 
country or culture can claim monopoly ownership of these traditions. They are not the exclusive 
product of Western society and have deep historical roots in non-Western societies that pre-date 
the European Enlightenment. Furthermore, the presence of these traditions in different cultures 
and countries across the world provide solid foundations for the development of modern theories of 
human rights. As Norani Othman - a human rights scholar from Malaysia - has questioned:  
"Does only Western discourse have the capacity to generate such a conception of human rights? 
Or can an affirmation of human rights be effectively and autonomously generated from within 
other, non-Western cultural traditions, philosophical idioms, and religious and civilisational 
frameworks? Are such intellectual resources available in other, non-Western contexts and 
traditions? (1999, 169)" 
Anthropological perspectives on shared ethical values  
As well as highlighting areas of difference and diversity, anthropological perspectives can assist in 
thinking about shared ethical values. Although new approaches in anthropology on action and 
advocacy tend to emphasis this idea, it is important to note that it is rare for even those 
anthropological approaches that highlight cultural relativism and non-intervention to reject the 
possibility of shared ethical values in its entirety. For example, Herskovits did not preclude the 
possibility of identifying universal moral criteria, and suggested that in thinking about cultural 
relativism, it is essential to differentiate between moral absolutes and moral universals.  
"Absolutes are fixed, and, in so far as convention is concerned, are not admitted to have 
variation, to differ from culture to culture, from epoch to epoch. Universals, on the other hand, are 
those least common denominators to be extracted, inductively, from comprehension of the range 
of variation which all phenomena of the natural or cultural world manifest ... To say that there is 
no absolute criterion of value and morals ... does not mean that such criteria, in differing forms, 
do not comprise universals in human culture" (1948, 76). 
Similarly, while characterising the dominant idea of human rights as "A Western construct with 
limited applicability", Schwab and Pollis have nevertheless attempted to construct a more adequate 
framework for thinking about human rights. In their view, "a fundamental revision of how human 
rights are viewed must take place so that a more realistic cross-cultural standard and perception of 
rights can be put into place" (1982, viii). Different historical experiences and cultural patterns lead 
to differing notions of human rights and there is a need for an alternative framework within which 
discourse on human rights can be advanced. In particular, it is vital "to evolve a cross-cultural 
community of shared perceptions regarding minimum human rights guarantees". Ultimately, the 
objective of these authors is to identify "[a] core of human rights guarantees that will insure at least 
minim personal security and will not violate traditional, ideological, or cultural values" (1982, 239-
240). Similarly, Renteln has attempted to identify a more "legitimate" framework for thinking about 
the cross-cultural foundations of human rights, rejecting the idea that human rights can be derived 
philosophically - from ideas of natural law and natural rights - and proposing an empirical methodology for identifying shared values based on the idea of cross-cultural validation. In 
Rentlen's view, the view that the theory of relativism does not necessarily preclude the possibility of 
cross-cultural universals, and the degree of convergence of ethical systems remains an open 
question until such time as cross-cultural empirical research provides an answer. Furthermore, 
Renteln proposes that it may be possible to establish a universal conception of human rights 
through empirical demonstration, invoking the presence of values and practices that function to 
limit arbitrary violence in different cultures, societies and historical periods as an example (1990, 
12, 138). Finally, Wilson has elaborated an approach that attempts to move beyond the 
universalism-relativism dichotomy and to develop a framework for thinking about the globalisation 
of human rights and the presence of trans-national legal institutions. For Wilson, the crucial 
question is not the ontological status of the idea of human rights, but rather how the meaning and 
use of this idea is materialised, imposed, resisted and transformed in different cultural, social and 
economic contexts.  
Sen's framework  
Sen's observation that the historical roots of modern liberal and democratic ideas "can be sought in 
terms of constitutive elements, rather than as a whole" (Sen, 1997, 35) also provides a useful 
framework for thinking about the cross-cultural foundations of human rights. In identifying the 
historical antecedents of the idea of human rights, it is important to recognise that elements that 
are consistent with and supportive of modern ideas about human rights have co-existed in Western 
philosophies and cultures with other elements that are neither supportive nor consistent with this 
idea. For example, ideas and practices including slavery, sexism, racism and fascism have deep 
historical roots in Western philosophies and cultures and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was itself prepared as a direct response to the systematic violation of human rights and the 
holocaust - in which millions of Jews, gypsies, homosexuals and others died - under fascist and 
Nazi regimes. Furthermore, the historical roots of the ideas of freedom, democracy, and equality, 
natural law and natural rights are often located in the philosophies that emerged in ancient Greece. 
Yet slavery was common-place in ancient Greece - with slaves working in domestic service, 
mining, farming, small-scale industries and public works - and although the Stoic idea of an inner-
freedom was of particular appeal to slaves, most Greek philosophers took the institution of slavery 
for granted. Plato challenged slavery for Greeks while taking for granted the institution of slavery 
and assuming that the enslavement of foreigners would continue ([c.375 BC]1987, 197). Aristotle 
acknowledged that some people "regard the control of slaves by a master as contrary to nature". In 
their view, the "distinction of master and slave is due to law or convention", and that the relation of 
master to slave is based on force, with "no warrant in justice". Nevertheless, Aristotle elaborated a 
justification of the institution of slavery, suggesting that some human beings lack the rational power 
necessary for freedom, and that it is in the interests of such people to be possessed by another as 
an "article of property".  
"(I)t is nature's intention ... to erect a physical difference between the bodies of freemen and 
those of the slaves, giving the latter strength for the menial duties of life, but making the former 
upright in carriage and ... useful for the various purposes of civic life ... It is thus clear that, just as 
some are by nature free, so others are by nature slaves, and for these latter the condition of 
slavery is both beneficial and just" ([350 BC] 1995, 13-14/&17). 
Therefore, in thinking about the cross-cultural foundations of human rights, it is important to avoid 
double standards. As Sen suggests, the presence of elements in different cultures from around the world that are not compatible with modern human rights standards - and the fact that these 
elements are sometimes selectively championed by leaders - ought not to be allowed to obscure 
the presence of other elements that are compatible with, and supportive of, modern ideas about 
human rights. Therefore, "(t)he presence of ... [constitutive] components [of the idea of human 
rights] must not be confused with the absence of the opposite, that is, with the presence of ideas 
and doctrines that clearly do not emphasise freedom and tolerance" (1997, 36). Sen has re-
appraised the ideas of certain non-Western thinkers and actors in the light of this principle (1997, 
35-40).  
"Re-occurring ethical principles" and the idea of the "Golden Rule"  
Some human rights thinkers and activists express the view that the principles of universalism 
embodied in the Universal Declaration are given authority by deeply-rooted traditions of 
universalism and tolerance in different cultures and religions from around the world. It is often 
argued that these traditions reflect centuries of diverse cultural practices, religious beliefs, 
philosophical reasoning and reflection on the nature of the human condition. Throughout human 
history, rules of behaviour have emerged that govern how people should treat one another, and in 
response to religious beliefs and ethical convictions, individuals and groups from diverse cultures 
and backgrounds have emphasised the importance of universalism and tolerance as the basis for 
peaceful co-existence. The importance of universal principles - the recognition that all people share 
a common humanity, that all individuals everywhere ought to be treated with equal respect and that 
individuals have negative and positive obligations to respect the dignity of others - has emerged as 
a fundamental and re-occurring element of philosophical reasoning, ethical conviction and religious 
belief. Arguably, these traditions provide solid cross-cultural foundations for the idea of human 
rights. This idea was reflected in a recent statement made by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
that suggested that ideals of tolerance and mercy have always and in all cultures been ideals of 
government rule and human behaviour. According to Annan:  
"Human rights are the expression of those traditions of tolerance in all cultures that are the basis 
of peace and progress ... Human rights are universal not only because their roots exist in all 
cultures and traditions ... The principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
are deeply rooted in the history of humankind. They can be found in the teachings of all the 
world's great cultural and religious traditions" (1997a). 
Amnesty International (AI) has also expressed the view that the idea of human rights is given 
authority by different ethical and religious traditions from around the world.  
"[The demands of the human rights movement] are grounded, ultimately, in the conviction that 
every human being has an intrinsic value. Over the centuries, this conviction has been given 
considerable authority from many sources - the dominant beliefs of many diverse cultures, the 
major world philosophies, and more recently, international declarations and laws (1992, 10-11)". 
In supporting this statement, A.I. cites expressions of an idea that I will describe as the idea of the 
ethic of common humanity from around the world (See Box). Despite the great diversity of 
religious, cultural and ethical belief and practice, similar expressions of the idea of the ethic of 
common humanity have been identified in different practices, religions and philosophies in different 
cultures and countries, and going back in history. The ethic is sometimes referred to as the 
"Golden Rule" - a "summary principle" that recognises that all people share a common humanity 
and that the intrinsic value and dignity of all individuals everywhere ought to be respected and 
protected. In its negative form, this ethic rules out double standards and aspires to uniformity and 
consistency in ethical practice, and recognises that all individuals ought to be treated, out of respect for their dignity, with equality and consistency of treatment. This principle provides an 
element of protection for others with whom the individual has no direct links, including others who 
are different, and others who are distant. In this way, the ethic of common humanity aspires to 
establish interpersonal obligations beyond a person's immediate connections or loyalties to 
individuals, families and groups. In its positive form, the ethic of common humanity establishes 
positive obligations of assistance and aid. Many people from diverse parts of the world argue that 
expressions of the ethic of common humanity reflect a shared commitment to these ideals, and are 
adopting these ideals as the basis for the construction of modern theories of human rights14.  
   
Expressions of the ethic of common humanity   
in different cultures and religions from around the world 
Brahamanism: “Do naught unto others which would cause you pain if done to you.” The 
Mahabharata.   
Buddhism: “Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful.” Udana-Varga: 5,18.  
Christianity: “Always treat others as you would like them to treat you.” New Testament. Matthew 
7:12  
Confucianism: “Do not unto others that you would not have them do unto you.” Analects, XV, 23.  
Islam: “No one of you is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he desires for 
himself.” Sunnah.  
Judaism: “What is hateful to you, do not to your fellowmen.” The Talmud, Shabbat, 31a.   
Taoism: “Regard your neighbour’s gain as your own gain, and your neighbour’s loss as your own 
loss.” T’ai Shang Kan Ying P’ien.   
Zoroastrianism: “That nature alone is good which refrains from doing unto another whatsoever is 
not good for itself.” Dadistan-i-dinik, 94:5.    (Source: Amnesty, 1992, 10-11.)  
The idea of an "overlapping consensus"  
The idea of an "overlapping consensus" has also gained ground in recent thinking about the cross-
cultural foundations of human rights. This idea entails thinking of different cultures in terms of 
"circles" or "sets", and thinking of shared values such as universalism and tolerance in terms of 
areas of "overlap" or "intersection". It has been influential in inter-faith and cross-cultural 
discussions about human rights and in contemporary political theory. For example, Charles Taylor 
poses the following question:  
"What would it mean to come to a genuine, unforced international consensus on human rights? I 
suppose it would be something like what Rawls describes in his Political Liberalism as an 
'overlapping consensus'. That is, different groups, countries, religious communities, and 
civilizations, although holding incompatible fundamental views on theology, metaphysics, human 
nature, and so on, would come to an agreement on certain norms that ought to govern human 
behaviour. Each would have its own way of justifying this from out of its profound background 
conception. We would agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the right norms, and we would be content to live in this consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound 
underlying belief" (1999, 124). 
Taylor suggests that the idea of human rights might be included in an "overlapping consensus" of 
this type. Condemnations of murder, genocide, torture and slavery in different cultures may provide 
a basis for this approach. The ideas of flourishing and well-being have also been highlighted in this 
context. Many human rights thinkers and activists argue that expressions of universalism, 
tolerance, respect for human dignity - and the idea of a shared commitment to the ethic of common 
humanity - provide possible routes forward.  
An "hermeneutical approach" to cross-cultural and inter-faith dialogue  
The Sudanese scholar Abdullah An-Na'im has developed a framework for thinking about the cross-
cultural foundations of human rights that builds on the propositions that human cultures are (1) 
identifiable and distinguishable from each other and (2) are characterized by their own internal 
diversity and propensity to change and mutual influence. In An-Na'im's view, these characteristics 
can be used to promote normative consensus within and among cultures through processes of 
cultural transformation (1994, 63). In particular, An-Na'im has advanced the idea of an 
hermeneutical approach to cross-cultural and inter-faith dialogue. This is an approach that 
recognises that religions are interpreted and reinterpreted and can be subject to change.  
"Religious traditions are hermeneutical processes: they do develop, change and - sometimes - 
improve in response to circumstances and in dialogue with their context" (An-Na'im et. al., 1995, 
vii). 
Working within this framework, An-Na'im has rejected the traditional emphasis of liberal political 
theory, arguing that it is neither possible nor desirable to identify a set of neutrally formulated 
human rights. For An-Na'im, the central issue is not the possibility of abstract or absolute neutrality 
from any religious, cultural or ideological regime, but rather how to reconcile commitments to 
diverse normative regimes with a commitment to a concept and set of universal human rights 
(1995a, 229). Given the facts of cultural and religious diversity, can human rights be interpreted 
and justified from within religious traditions, such that they are supported, rather than undermined, 
as the "common core" of a universal morality? [An-Na'im et. al. (1995, viii)].  
In considering this question, An-Na'im suggests that cross-cultural dialogue can promote 
universality at a theoretical or conceptual level by highlighting moral and philosophical 
commonalities of human cultures and experiences.  
" (T)he Golden Rule of treating others as one would wish to be treated by them - which is found in 
some formulation or another in all the major cultural traditions of the world - can be presented as 
a universal moral foundation of human rights norms. This principle of reciprocity could provide 
universal rationale for human rights as those rights which one would claim for himself or herself, 
and must therefore concede to others. However, efforts to articulate shared values and principles 
must be founded on mutual respect and sensitivity to the integrity of other cultures, especially in 
view of colonial and post-colonial power relations between the North and South" (1994, 68). 
However, An-Na'im has emphasised the importance of areas of diversity and potential conflict - as 
well as areas of overlap and agreement - for contemporary thinking about the cross-cultural 
foundations of human rights. In An-Na'im's view, human rights strategies that focus exclusively on 
areas of overlap and agreement - and that fail to take account of those areas of difficulty and 
complexity - will not only be theoretically and conceptually inadequate, but are also unlikely to be successful in practice. Human rights are contextually interpreted and it is from their context that 
they acquire their practical meaning. Therefore, "it is important to seek to formulate, interpret and 
implement all internationally-recognised human rights in proper cultural context" (1994, 63). 
Strategies for securing human rights should take into account the diverse loyalties, commitments 
and beliefs of different individuals and groups - even where these diverse loyalties, commitments 
and beliefs come into potential conflict with international human rights law.  
"The precondition of a real dialogical study of religious diversity is the full appreciation of the 
divergencies among traditions. Inter-religious dialogue on morality should not begin with simple 
statements about supposedly common notions and thus avoid awkward issues...The problem is 
whether the diverse religious anthropologies give way to a common core of 'universal' rights and 
stimulate adherents to acknowledge them in their cultural context, or prevent adherents from 
doing so" (Vroom and Reinders, 1995, xiii). 
For example, An-Na'im suggests that some religious value systems - including orthodox 
perceptions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam - tend to deny women equality with men. 
Consequently, the enforcement of equality for women by the state could infringe the right of certain 
Jewish, Protestant, Roman Catholic and Islamic communities to religious freedom. In this context, 
An-Na'im suggests that a human rights strategy is most likely to be successful if it takes explicit 
account of this area of difficulty and conflict.  
"Without due regard to the consequences or implications of ...diversity and specificity, there is 
little prospect of global normative consensus ... [Furthermore] if the dangers of ambiguity or 
confusion are not addressed, the consensus thereby achieved might be superficial and 
perfunctory" (1994, 63). 
In this way, An-Na'im has focussed attention on the importance of culture and context for the 
implementation of human rights strategies. His views suggest that "efforts to promote respect for 
international human rights standards are often likely to remain superficial and ineffectual until ... 
they relate directly to, and where possible are promoted through, local cultural, religious and other 
traditional communities" (Alston, 1994,8). Furthermore, An-Na'im suggests that cross-cultural and 
inter-faith dialogue on the subject of human rights is most likely to be successful if direct 
confrontation is avoided and dialogue is based on a combination of mediation, internal discourse 
and reconciliation. In particular, individuals and groups ought not to be confronted with the need to 
make exclusive choices between religious commitment on the one hand, and international human 
rights law on the other.  
"To avoid undermining the legitimacy of a universal human rights project by placing it in direct 
competition with what people hold as their comprehensive fundamental value system, I would 
strongly recommend a strategy of internal transformation of perceptions of the religion, culture or 
ideology in question in order to reconcile the former with the latter" (1995a, 230). 
An-Na'im's framework is notable in that it emphasises the role of culture and context - and of 
diversity and conflict - whilst leaving the space for ultimate agreement and overlap on human rights 
issues. While suggesting that the doctrine of human rights is the outcome of a particular period in 
the history of Western culture and philosophy, An-Na'im has not rejected the idea of human rights. 
Rather, An-Nai'm has responded to the relativist critique by articulating the case for better 
representation and incorporation of non-Western perspectives and for greater cultural awareness 
and sensitivity within UN human rights processes (Alston, 1994; Alston and Gilmour-Walsh, 1996, 
35-36). An-Na'im's framework for thinking about human rights is widely recognised as a far-
reaching attempt to transform cross-cultural and inter-faith dialogue into a "global and mutual 
venture" - rather than the promotion and imposition of a particular cultural or religious interpretation 
of the idea of human rights (An-Na'im et. al, 1995, xvii). This framework comprises a significant 
contribution to contemporary thinking about the cross-cultural foundations of human rights.  3. ANTECEDENTS OF THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN DIFFERENT CULTURES AND 
TRADITIONS FROM AROUND THE WORLD  
3.1 Antecedents in Islamic traditions of tolerance, freedom and rights  
Against this background, human rights thinkers and activists have responded to the relativist 
critique by challenging the impression of a monolithic Islam that is inconsistent with the idea of 
universal human rights. As Halliday (1996) suggests, this impression can arise as a consequence 
of imperialist, racist and essentialist prejudices and processes. Said's (1995) theory of orientalism - 
which links the representation of the idea of Islam in Western countries to theories of discourse and 
power - is particularly insightful in this context. In addition, contemporary movements for 
"Islamization" and "fundamentalism" can give the impression of a monolithic Islam that is 
inconsistent with modern ideas about human rights15. Challenges to these perspectives often 
highlight the heterogeneity and diversity of Islamic thought, practice and religious interpretation, 
and suggest that societies with large Muslim populations cannot be represented by a single, 
homogenous system of values. For example, Halliday notes that there are over fifty Muslim states 
in the world - with a variety of legal and political systems - and that there is no single body - political 
or religious - that speaks for the Muslim world as a whole. In contrast to Christianity, the Muslim 
religion is highly fragmented and operates without even a purported theological and legal central 
authority. Hence in Halliday's view:  
"While many aspire or claim to speak in the name of all Muslims, none do. There is, for example, 
a world of difference between the position of Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, with its promotion of 
a conservative 'Islamic' code of rights, and that of Tunisia, which has been in the forefront of the 
battle for universal rights and which even proposed at the pre-Vienna 'African' conference a 
denunciation of the threat to human rights posed by religious fundamentalism. In confronting the 
claims made by governments, individual writers or organizations, one has to take account of their 
specific context and not assume that they speak for one 'Islamic' world or tradition, or that theirs 
is the only possible or legitimate interpretation of the religion. We are dealing with a diversity of 
views and interpretations, not a single body of thought" (1996,142-143). 
The deep-rooted nature of traditions of tolerance, rights, equity and social justice within the Islamic 
world have also been highlighted in this context. For example, Lauren highlights the famous 
"Charter of Cyrus" elaborated by "Cyrus the Great" in the Persian Empire more than two thousand 
years ago. This Charter recognised certain rights of liberty and security, freedom of movement and 
religious belief, inspiring the Sultan Farrukh Hablul Matin to write:  
"For he, it was who, with supreme insight,  
Launched an Empire based not on physical might  
But on the vision of a family of nations  
Linked by bands of Humanity, truth and right" [cited in Lauren (1998, 11)]. 
Lauren also focuses attention on the work of Al-Farabi, an Islamic philosopher of the tenth century, 
who wrote in his book The Outlook of the People of the City of Virtue of a vision of a moral society 
in all which individuals were endowed with rights and lived in love and charity with their neighbours 
(1998, 11). Similarly, the UN Secretary General has highlighted the relevance of Islamic traditions 
of equity and mercy to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, noting that Imam Ali, the fourth 
Khalifa after Prophet Muhammed, instructed the governor of Egypt to rule with mercy and tolerance 
towards all his subjects:  
"... Let the dearest of your treasuries be the treasury of righteous action... Infuse your heart with 
mercy, love and kindness for your subjects. Be not in the face of them a voracious animal, counting them as easy prey, for they are of two kinds: either they are your brothers in religion or 
your equals in creation" [cited in Annan (1997a)]. 
Annan has also highlighted the work of Sa'adi, the thirteenth century Persian poet, who offered a 
moving tribute to the values of tolerance and equality among all peoples and nations:  
"The children of Adam are limbs of one another And in their creation come from one substance. 
When the world gives pain to one member, The other members find no rest. Thou who are 
indifferent to the sufferings of others Do not deserve to be called a man" [cited in Annan (1997a)]. 
In addition, some human rights thinkers and activists have challenged the theological basis of the 
view that there is a fundamental inconsistency between Islam and the idea of human rights. Many 
Muslim thinkers and activists elaborate their claims for human rights within a religious discourse 
and particular emphasis has been placed on citing and promoting understanding of classic Islamic 
texts that are consistent with and/or supportive of the modern idea of human rights in this context. 
It is important to recognise that Islam is a highly rights-focussed religion and certain Islamic 
precepts and principles place a great emphasis on reform and rights to protect the interests and 
well-being of vulnerable, oppressed and needy groups. Arguably, these precepts and principles 
comprise important antecedents of the modern idea of human rights and - when analysed in their 
historical context - these precepts and principles can provide foundations for modern ideas about 
human rights. For example, more than 1400 years ago, Qur'anic injunctions emphasised the 
importance of human diversity, tolerance and respect for human diversity; condemned, limited and 
regulated the practice of slavery; protected the interests of vulnerable children including orphans 
and girls; recognised rights that limited the harsh consequences of discrimination against women; 
and introduced reforms to ensure better provision for the poor.  
   
The Qur’an ushered in an age of reform and rights 
Human diversity, tolerance and mutual respect  Many Qur’anic verses are interpreted as 
implying that diversity and plurality are inherent characteristics of the human condition and that 
these characteristics ought to be tolerated and respected. For example, one Qur’anic verse 
states: “We [God] have created you [human beings] into [different] peoples and tribes so that you 
may [all] get to know [understand and co-operate with] each other; the most honourable among 
you in the sight of God are the pious [righteous] ones” [49:13, translation in An-Na’im (1995a, 
232)]. Another states: “For each community, we have granted a Law and a Code of Conduct. If 
God wished, He could have made you One community, but he wishes rather to test you through 
that which has been given to you. So vie with each other to excel in goodness and moral virtue” 
[5:48, translation in Nanji (1993, 110)].   
Treatment of non-Muslims More than fourteen hundred years ago, discrimination against 
religious minorities was the norm in many different countries and societies. Shari’a limited the 
harsh consequences of discrimination against religious minorities in Muslim societies, restricting 
discrimination, and reducing its scope (An-Na’im, 1990, 170&175). Fundamental rights of non-
Muslims to protection from internal tyranny and persecution, and freedom of religious practice and 
personal status, were recognised (Ally, 1996, 253). When judged in their historical context and 
against the European record, these principles for the treatment of non-Muslims are often noted for 
their relative tolerance and humanity (Mayer, 1999, 136).   
The limitation and regulation of slavery. Fourteen hundred years ago, slavery was a common 
practice in many different parts of the world. Qur’anic injunctions limited and regulated the 
practice of slavery by emphasising the dignity and personal safety of slaves, and encouraging 
their emancipation (e.g. 5:89, 24:33, 58:3, 90:13.)  New rights for women. Certain practices that affected the interests and wellbeing of women 
were reformed by Islam. For example, Qur’anic injunctions qualified the exercise of polygamy by 
Muslim men, and protected women by giving them more control over their dowry. In addition, 
while distinguishing between the position of men and the position of women, the Qur’an states 
“And for women are rights over men similar to those of men over women” (2:228), and recognises 
the rights of women to own property, to a share of inheritance and to divorce. When analysed in 
their historical context, it is generally agreed that these reforms and rights limited the harsh 
consequences of discrimination against women (An-Na’im, 1990, 170&175). Indeed, some 
scholars have argued that, given the position of women in many cultures and societies fourteen 
hundred years ago, the reforms and rights for women recognised in the Qur’an would have been 
considered “revolutionary” (Othman, 1999, 181).  
Provisions for the protection of the well-being of the girl-child. Qur’anic injunctions condemn 
practices that adversely affect the wellbeing and rights of the girl-child. For example, one verse in 
the Qur’an condemns the practice of female infanticide. “When the female (infant), Buried alive, is 
questioned - For what crime She was killed; [81:8-9, translation in ‘Al? (1998)].  
Recognition of the importance of education for men and women.  The Prophet Muhammad is 
reported to have said: “The search for knowledge is an obligation laid on every Muslim” [Hadith, 
Book II, Knowledge, translation in Robson (1963, 54)]. The word every is generally interpreted as 
including men and women and this Hadith is interpreted by many scholars as implying that there 
is an obligation on all Muslims - girls and boys, men and women - to pursue their education as far 
as possible [eg Ali (n.d., 31&39), Goldsack (1923, 18), Hamidullah (1979, 15-20), Ally (1996, 
239)]. In addition, the Prophet Muhammad is reported to have made arrangements for the 
education of women as well as men and to have encouraged the education of people from all 
social strata, including the education of slave girls [Hadith, Book III, Knowledge, 4-5: translation in 
Ali (n.d, 33-34)].  
Obligations to assist. Islam places a great emphasis on social and economic justice and the 
Qur’an introduced far-reaching rights and obligations to protect the interests of the poor, needy 
and vulnerable. For example, the rights of orphans to identity and inheritance are protected and 
one Qur’anic verse states: “And in their wealth and possessions (was remembered) the right of 
the (needy)” [51:19, translation in ‘Al? (1998, 1358)]. The Qur’an encourages assistance for 
vulnerable and poor groups such as orphans, the needy and the travelling homeless (eg 2.215) 
and the obligation to assist members of the wider community is institutionalised through the duty 
of poor-due or zakah [2:43, translation in Pickthall (1996, 10)]. The UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights has recently highlighted the relevance of the Islamic conception of the obligation to 
assist to Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that " everyone has 
duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is 
possible" [Robinson (1998)]. 
Islam and the human rights of women  
In challenging the theological basis of female subordination in Islamic societies, human rights 
thinkers have often emphasised the reforming influence of classic Islamic texts, and contrasted 
these with the subsequent development of religious interpretations and legal codifications. On the 
one hand, it is often argued that Qur'anic reforms and rights improved the position of women 
favourably, both in relation to certain pre-Islamic practices, and in relation to the position of women 
in many other contemporaneous cultures and societies. For example, Othman notes that:  
"Muslims past and present, from all juristic schools (madhhab) and political persuasions, orthodox 
conservatives as well as modernists, acknowledge that Islam was the earliest religion to emancipate women, giving them rights unknown to any other society at the time. They agree that 
the Qur'an introduced various positive reforms for women, including a woman's right to contract 
marriage, to divorce, and to inherit and dispose of her property as she pleases" (1999, 177-8). 
On the other hand, many human rights thinkers and activists have suggested that these 
progressive tendencies are not reflected in certain interpretations and codifications in Shari'a Law. 
For example, in Othman's view:  
"Although progressive in tendency, these early ideas of the rights and status of women did not 
develop further, nor did they sustain any emancipating or egalitarian impetus within the 
interpretation of Shari'a by later generations of Muslims ... A disregard for the historical context 
within which the Shari'a was constructed, and for the historical character of the Shari'a itself as it 
was developed and applied within early and classical Islamic civilisation, has permitted 
fundamentalists to perpetuate in our own times a pre-modern antagonism against women" 
(1999,178/172). 
In analysing this issue, human rights thinkers and activists have emphasised the importance of 
human agency in the construction of gender discrimination in Islamic societies and in the 
development of certain elements of Shari'a Law. For example, An-Na'im suggests that - although 
women have full legal capacity under Shari'a in relation to civil law and commercial law matters, in 
the sense that they have the requisite legal personality to hold and dispose of property and 
otherwise acquire or lose civil liabilities in their own independent rights - Muslim women do not 
enjoy human rights on an equal footing with Muslim men under Shari'a law. Yet in elaborating this 
view, An-Na'im emphasises the human as oppose to the divine basis of certain elements of Shari'a 
Law, highlighting the distinction between (a) the provisions in the Qur'an (that Muslims believe to 
be the word of God); (b) the provisions in the Hadith (the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad); and 
(c) the interpretation, application, development and codification of these standards. Hence for An-
Na'im, Shari'a is not the whole of Islam but instead is an interpretation of its fundamental sources. 
It is best understood "through a consideration for the impact of the historical context within which 
Shari'a was constructed by the founding jurists of the eighth and ninth centuries out of the original 
sources of Islam (1990, 165). Similarly, for Othman, what is at present accepted as a body of 
Islamic tenets and laws concerning women does not rest solely on the Qur'an or on direct 
interpretation of its text. It also includes references and interpretations from traditions (Hadith and 
Sunna of the Prophet) as well as accumulated interpretations (tafsir) of classical scholars and 
exegetes. In this way, Othman suggests that the Islamic paradigm of the ideal role, status, and 
duties of Muslim women was largely derived form the tafsir of male jurists and scholars - 
particularly those of the classical age of Islamic civilisation (1999,178).  
The importance of cultural and political variables has also been emphasised in this context. For 
example, Nanji suggests that certain rules codified into Shari'a Law reflect patriarchal traditions that 
pre-dated the Qur'an Islam and that "the development and occurrence of customs and practices of 
seclusion and veiling of women were a result of local tradition and customs, occasionally 
antithetical to the spirit of emancipation of women envisaged in the Qur'an" (1993, 109). Othman 
suggests that the interpretation and application of certain religious and legal rules may be 
contingent on local conditions including cultural factors and invokes the rule of hijab - which entails 
not just the covering of a woman's face, but also female seclusion and the segregation of social 
space - as an illustration. In Othman's view, whereas this separation characterises gender relations 
in much of the Middle East, it is not a traditional characteristic of all countries and societies with 
large Muslim populations. In Malaysia and other parts of South East Asia, local cultural traditions, 
including that of adat, define and affirm women's role and public contribution and participation - 
often in positive, non-hierarchical ways. Consequently, tensions between Southeast Asian cultural definitions of women's gender roles and rights and traditional Islamic formulations have arisen in 
relation to the rule of hijab (1999,178). Similar debates have arisen in relation to the practice of 
"tribal honour" in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the practice of clitoridectomy or female circumcision in 
parts of Africa and Arabia and the policy implemented in a number of Muslim countries that bans 
women from being judges (Halliday, 1996, 147). In addition, political variables have been invoked 
as possible explanations of certain discriminatory laws and practices. For example, Mayer 
suggests that whereas certain elements of Islamic Law are often represented as theologically 
binding, eternal and unchangeable, these elements are in fact interpretations that can and do 
change. Analysing the grounds of reservations entered by various governments to international 
human rights treaties including CEDAW as part of a political process, she suggests that 
justifications for these reservations often reflect the view that there is a single and immutable 
Islamic law. In reality, however, personal status laws vary from one Muslim country to another and 
change over time within one country and under different political administrations. Furthermore, 
there is enormous interpretative variety on issues relating to family law and on the question of 
precisely what Islamic sources mandate in terms of status for women (1995, 107-118).  
Some human rights thinkers and activists have suggested that an important agenda for change can 
be based on the distinction between Qur'anic Law on the one hand, and the interpretation and 
codification of Islamic religious and legal principles on the other. According to Othman:  
"[The] gap between the ethical principles of the Qur'an concerning gender equality and the kinds 
of retrogressive and male-centred interpretations that have been codified into Shari'a law 
provides a challenge for modern Muslim women's pursuit of equality and respect for their rights 
(1999,175/6). 
This approach has been applied in practice to the development of human rights strategies. As a 
leading member of Sisters of Islam - an autonomous non-government organisation of Muslim 
women - Othman suggests that the primary project for Muslim women's groups in their struggle for 
women's rights is not simply the recognition of international treaties such as CEDAW. The 
importance of the increasingly positive record of countries with large Muslim populations signing 
and ratifying international human rights instruments cannot be denied. However, in Othman's view, 
the need for Muslim women to relate their claims to their rights under their own cultural and 
religious traditions - including their rights under Islam - is also fundamental. A key issue is "the 
need for consensus within their own culture that the kinds of women's rights they are advocating 
are indeed acceptable on the grounds of a public ethic derived form their own cultural and religious 
sources" (1999,189). For example, polygamy is an important issue for women's groups in 
Malaysia. In challenging the notion that men have an inalienable right to exercise polygamy - rather 
than relying exclusively on international human rights instruments including CEDAW - these 
standards could be linked to theological challenges based on the notion of consent (1999, 179-
181).  
Indeed, some thinkers and activists go further, suggesting that the rights introduced in the Qur'an 
provide a revolutionary basis for a feminist agenda. For example, Fatima Mernissi - a feminist and 
a founding member of the Moroccan Organisation for Human Rights - is a leading proponent of the 
view that Islamic ideas and traditions provide rich foundations for ideas of gender equality and the 
human rights of women. She has expressed the view that:  "... Muslim women can walk into the modern world with pride, knowing that the quest for dignity, 
democracy, and human rights, for full participation in the political and social affairs for our 
country, stems from no imported Western values, but is a true part of the Muslim tradition ... 
Ample historical evidence portrays women in the Prophet's Medina raising their heads from 
slavery and violence to claim their right to join, as equal participants, in the making of their Arab 
history. Women fled aristocratic tribal Mecca by the thousands to enter Medina, the Prophet's city 
in the seventh century, because Islam promised equality and dignity for all, for men and women, 
masters and servants. Every woman who came to Medina when the Prophet was the political 
leader of Muslims could gain access to full citizenship, the status of sahabi, Companion of the 
Prophet. Muslims can take pride that in their language they have the feminine of that word, 
sahabiyat, women who enjoyed the right to enter into the councils of the Muslim umma, to speak 
freely to its Prophet-leader, to dispute with the men, to fight for their happiness, and to be 
involved in the management of military and political affairs. The evidence is there in the works of 
religious history, in the biographical details of sahabiyat by the thousand who built Muslim society 
side by side with their male counterparts" (1991, viii). 
Areas of theoretical complexity  
However, human rights agendas of these types raise various theoretical complexities. Whereas 
human rights thinkers and activists tend to cite those verses of the Qur'an that are consistent with 
and supportive of the modern idea of human rights, the possibility remains that other verses are 
inconsistent with or even contradictory to modern ideas about human rights (Othman, 1999, 174). 
The analysis of the Sudanese human rights scholar An-Na'im is particularly important in this 
context. An-Na'im has cautioned against approaches that overlook the difficulties and complexities 
involved in reconciling certain aspects of Shari'a law with modern international human rights law, 
and has emphasised that it is important for human rights thinkers and activists to cite those 
elements of foundational Islamic texts that give rise to areas of theoretical ambiguity and conflict, 
as well as those that are consistent with, and supportive of, modern ideas about human rights16. In 
addition, while An-Na'im defends the proposition that the Qur'an and the Sunna modified and 
tightened the harsh consequences of slavery and discrimination on grounds of religion or gender, 
he emphasises that improving on a pre-existing situation is not the same as the recognition of a 
modern human right (1990, 170). Therefore:  
"[T]he concept [of human rights] must be distinguished fundamentally from any regime of rights, 
however favourable it may be, which distinguishes between human beings on ground of gender. 
It should also be noted that Shari'a not only distinguishes between the rights of Muslim men and 
women, but discriminates against women in this regard" (1995b, 57). 
An-Na'im suggests that human rights strategies that fail to acknowledge these areas of difficulty 
and complexity are likely to be ineffective because they fail to provide a framework in which areas 
of difficulty and inconsistency can be explicitly raised and negotiated. Whereas modern 
international human rights law is based on the principles of universality and non-discrimination, 
rights and personal status under Shari'a law are based on certain gender and religious distinctions. 
In addition, Shari'a does not prohibit slavery. Consequently, the implementation of Shari'a law as a 
basis for public law raises particular concerns in relation to discrimination against women and non-
Muslims and in relation to the practice of slavery. In An-Na'im's view, there is a need to explicitly 
recognise the inadequacy of historical Shari'a as a basis for human rights in the Muslim context 
and to pose an alternative Islamic foundation for universal human rights [(1990, 164&170-177), 
(1995a, 238)].  
"[T]he only effective approach to achieve sufficient reform of Shari'a in relation to universal 
human rights is to cite sources in the Qur'an and Sunna which are inconsistent with universal 
human rights and explain them in historical context, while citing those sources which are supportive of human rights as the basis of the legally applicable principles and rules of Islamic 
law today" (1990, 171) 17. 
Against this background, An-Na'im has called for an Islamic Reformation - a critical re-examination 
and re-interpretation of Islam's foundational texts - with a view to removing the bases of 
discrimination against non-Muslims and women, and reconciling Islamic law with a full range of 
human rights. He has proposed a far-reaching reform methodology for Islamic public law based on 
a (claimed) distinction between Qur'anic verses from the Mecca and Medina periods (1990, 179-
181), and has expressed the view that: "[o]nce it is appreciated that Shari'a was constructed by its 
founding jurists, it should become possible to think about reconstructing certain aspects of Shari'a, 
provided that such reconstruction is based on the same fundamental sources of Islam and is fully 
consistent with its essential moral and religious precepts" (1990, xiv).  
Debates pertaining to the theological interpretation of Islamic texts can and should only be resolved 
within the internal discourse of the Muslim community, and the evaluation of this proposal is 
beyond the scope of this Paper. However, a number of general points can be made. First, An-
Na'im's reform methodology is based on the teachings of Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, who was tried 
for sedition and other offences and publicly executed in Sudan in 1985 (Voll, 1990, ix-x), and the 
idea of putting aside Medinan verses could be regarded as heretical by traditionalists (Othman, 
1999,191). Second, An-Na'im's proposed approach is unusual and important in that it represents a 
human rights agenda that reflects the importance of challenging traditionalist and fundamentalist 
perspectives within a theological paradigm. This approach contrasts sharply with the views of many 
other human rights thinkers and activists including Halliday (1996, 157), who is sceptical of the 
possibility of religious foundations for the idea of human rights, and highlights the secularist 
approaches of Gökalp and Atatürk. Third, it is important to avoid double standards and to 
recognise that - although the implementation of Shari'a law as a basis of public law in some 
countries raises particularly pressing issues - the relationship between modern international human 
rights law and many different religions is highly complex. Certain provisions in many different 
religions may be interpreted as being inconsistent with modern ideas about human rights and the 
position of many religions on human rights issues is changing and evolving18.  
Prospects for Islamic foundations for human rights  
As Othman notes, these are complex issues involving "the validity and hegemony of certain 
religious interpretations over others, gender bias, patriarchy, and the politics of identity" (1999, 
191). The difficulties and complexities involved are exacerbated by the fact that support for the idea 
of a separate Islamic concept of human rights is characteristic of a number of different movements, 
interests and agendas. The pamphlets on Islam and human rights by Tabandeh (1970) and 
Mawdudi (1980), together with the increasing number of official documents on Islam and human 
rights19, may be particularly illuminating in this context. In addition, the idea of a separate Islamic 
concept of the human rights of women has been promoted by movements for Islamization and 
fundamentalist movements in Muslim countries. Yet these difficulties and complexities should not 
be allowed to obscure the fact that millions of Muslims from all over the world rely on these deep-
rooted Islamic traditions of tolerance, freedom, equity and rights as a foundation for criticising the 
violation of human rights. Hence, in response to the deteriorating human rights situation in the 
Sudan in 1997, an imam stated: "Islam does not accept oppression and confiscation of the rights of 
the people and suppression of the freedom of expression" [cited in Mayer (1999, 25)]. In Iran, a 
distinguished cleric and religious leader, the late Ayatollah Taleghani, reasoned that the religion of Islam does not deprive people of their rights to protect, criticise, protest, discuss and debate.  
   
The words of the late Ayatollayh Taleghani, a prominent Iranian cleric  
“The most dangerous of all forms of oppression are laws and restrictions forcibly imposed on 
people in the name of religion. This is what the Monks, through collaboration with the ruling 
classes, did with all the people in the name of religion. This is the most dangerous of all 
impositions, because that which is not from God is thrust upon the people to enslave and 
suppress them and prevent them from evolving, depriving them of the right to protest, criticise and 
be free. These very chains and shackles are the ones which the Prophet [Muhammad] came to 
destroy. Islam is an invitation to peace and freedom. Let us keep aside opportunism, group 
interests, forcible imposition of ideas and, God forbid, dictatorships under the cover of religion. 
[Let us] raise our voices with the toiling, oppressed, the deprived masses. Islam as we know it, 
the Islam which originates from the [Qur’an] and the traditions of Prophet, does not restrict 
freedom. Any group that wants to restrict people’s freedom, [the freedom] to criticise, protest, 
discuss and debate, does not comprehend Islam”.     Cited in Mayer (1999, 25). 
3.2 Antecedents in Confucian traditions of universalism and tolerance  
It is sometimes proposed that East Asian countries including China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Vietnam share a common Confucian culture. The precepts that are thought 
to be representative of this culture are often encapsulated in the term "Asian values". A second 
proposition - that Confucian culture and "Asian values" constitute an obstacle to the full 
implementation of international standards in the field of human rights - has also come to the fore in 
recent years, and was particularly influential in the negotiations at the World Conference on Human 
Rights. These international events have unleashed an unprecedented debate within East Asian 
societies about the nature and scope of so-called "Asian values" and their compatibility with ideas 
about human rights. Many Asian NGOs during the Vienna process contested the representation of 
Confucianism in terms of values that are opposed to modern human rights standards, and the 
representation of Confucian culture in terms of a monolithic set of "Asian values" has been 
challenged. Many authors have suggested that East Asia is a diverse region, with heterogeneous 
cultures and traditions, many of which are consistent with, and provide a foundation for, modern 
ideas about human rights. For example, Leys argues that:  
"Imperial Confucianism only extolled those statements from the Master that prescribed 
submission to the established authorities, whereas more essential notions were conveniently 
ignored - such as the precepts of social justice, political dissent, and the moral duty for 
intellectuals to criticise the ruler (even at the risk of their lives) when he was abusing his power, or 
when he oppressed the people" (1997, xvi). 
Sen (1997) also cautions against representations of a monolithic Confucianism, and suggests that 
the fact that certain elements within Confucius' Analects have been selectively invoked by critics of 
international human rights standards does not undermine the validity of other elements that are 
consistent with, and provide a Confucian foundation for, these standards.  
"The championing of order and discipline can be found in Western classics as well. Indeed, it is 
by no means clear to me that Confucius is more authoritarian than, say, Plato or Augustine. The 
real issue is not whether these non-freedom perspectives are present in Asian traditions, but 
whether the freedom-oriented perspectives are absent from them" (Sen, 1997, 36). Three injunctions issued by Confucius reflect an emphasis on the ideas of universalism and 
tolerance as a basis for general morality.  
   
Universalism in Confucius’ Analects 
“Chung-kung asked about benevolence. The Master said, ‘… Do not impose on others what you 
yourself do not desire’” (XII.2).  
“Tzu-kung asked, ‘Is there a single word which can be a guide to conduct throughout one’s life?’ 
The Master said, ‘It is perhaps the word “shu”. Do not impose on others what you yourself do not 
desire’” (XV.24).  
“Fan Ch’ih asked about benevolence. The Master said, ‘Love your fellow men’” (XII.22).  
Source: Confucius ([c.480 BC] 1979)] 
The method of Shu is central to Confucius' Analects. Shu is a process or method for discovering 
what other people wish or do not wish done to them. Individuals are required to undertake a 
thought experiment, whereby they put themselves in the position of others, and ask what, in that 
position, they would like or dislike, and to treat others accordingly. This requirement is expressed 
both as a negative obligation ("Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire") and a 
positive obligation ("Love your fellow men"). As in other ethical systems, the principles of 
universalism and tolerance provide a basis for far-reaching interpersonal obligations. Individual 
conduct is governed by principles that provide an element of protection for others who are distant 
and different, and individuals are required to treat all people - not just one's family or those with 
which he or she has direct links. These elements of Confucius' Analects reveal the deep roots for 
the ideas of consistency and uniformity in ethics, and equality of treatment, in Confucian traditions 
and practices. The recognition that all individuals ought to be treated with equal respect, the idea of 
equality and consistency of treatment, provide a fertile foundation for the development of modern 
ideas of human rights.  
Human rights scholars in East Asia have also challenged the representation of Confucianism in 
terms of values that suppresses individual criticism and encourage unconditional submission to 
authority. The work of human rights scholars on the Chinese mainland - including the work of Du 
Gangjian and Song Gang (1995) - has been particularly influential in this context. In direct 
opposition to the view that there is a cultural impediment to developing human rights in Chinese 
society, these authors suggest that Confucian precepts can provide a Chinese foundation for 
modern theories of human rights. The interpretation of these authors is that the Analects make 
clear that not every government is just, wise, or legitimate, that rulers can be wrong and 
incompetent. Where there is misrule, Confucius does not recommend absolute obedience - or 
unlimited submission to power - over individual freedom of expression, criticism and resistance. 
Indeed, Confucius rejects the idea of co-operation with non-benevolent rulers, and encourages 
actions of citizenship, independence and freedom of speech, criticism of government, the right to 
be a dissident, and resistance to arbitrary power.  
   Freedom of expression in Confucius’ Analects 
“Zilu asked how to serve a prince. The Master said: ‘Tell him the truth even if it offends him’” 
(14.22).  
“When the Way prevails in the state, speak boldly and act boldly. When the state has lost the 
Way, act boldly and speak softly” (14.3).  Source: Confucius ([c.480 BC] 1997). 
The Analects also advise rulers about good government and responsibility. According to Du 
Gangjian and Song Gang (1995, 40), principles of universalism and tolerance expressed in the 
Analects were intended not only to govern individual conduct, but also to establish that rulers 
should not force their subjects to do what the subjects were reluctant to do. Clearly, Confucius was 
not a democrat, and took for granted a hierarchical and elitist system of rule. Nevertheless, the 
message at the heart of the Analects is that the power and authority of rulers is not unlimited, and 
that the common people will resist arbitrary and improper rule. Therefore, rulers should govern in 
the interests of the common people. This injunction begins with the satisfaction of material needs. 
Rulers should ensure that the people have sufficient food, and should not take away their means of 
subsistence by forcing them away from their land during the busy seasons. Punishment should be 
regulated.  
   
“Tzu-kung asked about government. The Master said, “Give them enough food …”” (XII.7).   
“The Master said, ‘In guiding a state of a thousand chariots, approach your duties with reverence 
and be trustworthy in what you say; avoid excesses in expenditure and love your fellow men; 
employ the labour of the common people only in the right seasons’” (I.5).  
“Tzu-chang said, ‘What is meant by the four wicked practices?’ The Master said, ‘To impose the 
death penalty without first attempting to reform is to be cruel; to expect results without first giving 
warning is to be tyrannical;” (XX.2).  
Source: Confucius ([c.480 BC] 1979). 
Interpretations that emphasise the presence of elements in Chinese thought that are supportive of 
and consistent with the modern idea of human rights are not new. In 1947, UNESCO contributed to 
the process of the drafting of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights by inviting various 
thinkers and writers from different countries and cultures around the world to submit their ideas 
about human rights. Chung-Sho Lo, Professor of Philosophy in West-China University, suggested 
that the early translators of Western philosophy found it difficult to find an equivalent term for 
"rights" in Chinese, and that Chinese ethics traditionally emphasised the fulfilment of mutual 
obligations rather than the fulfilment of rights. However, in Chung-Sho Lo's view, this did not imply 
that the Chinese never claimed human rights. Indeed, Chung-Sho Lo expressed the view that the 
idea of human rights developed very early in China, and that the right of the people to revolt 
against oppressive rulers was established very early on.  "In the Book of History, an old Chinese classic, it is stated: "Heaven sees as our people see; 
Heaven hears as our people hear. Heaven is compassionate towards the people. What the 
people desire, Heaven will be found to bring about'. A ruler has a duty to heaven to take care of 
the interests of his people. In loving his people, the ruler follows the will of Heaven. So it says in 
the same book: 'Heaven loves the people; and the Sovereign must obey Heaven'. When the ruler 
no longer rules for the welfare of the people, it is the right of the people to revolt against him and 
dethrone him ... The right to revolt was repeatedly expressed in Chinese history ... A great 
Confucianist, Mencius (372-289 B.C.), strongly maintained that a government should work for the 
will of the people. He said: 'People are of primary importance. The State is of less importance. 
The sovereign is of least importance" [Chung-Sho Lo: UNESCO (1948, 186-7)]. 
ANTECEDENTS OF THE IDEA OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN CHINESE TRADITIONS 
AND HISTORY   
Concern with individual rights and the rule of law in ancient China  
Law above power. “Never alter a law to suit the whims of a ruler; law is superior to the ruler”. 
Kuan-tzu, On Legislation, 4th to 3rd century B.C., China: (UNESCO,1969, 122).   
Individual rights and justice as a basis for harmony and unity. “What makes society 
possible?  Individual rights. What makes individual rights tenable? Justice. Therefore when justice 
and rights are adjusted, there is harmony. Where there is harmony, there is unity”. Hsün-tzu, The 
Way of Kings, 3rd century BC, China: (UNESCO,1969, 522).  
Individual rights and well-being as a basis for corporate life. “The consequence of individual 
life without mutual aid is poverty; the consequence of corporate life without recognition of 
individual rights is strife. Poverty means anxiety; strife spells misfortune. In order to relieve anxiety 
and eradicate strife, nothing is as effective as the institution of corporate life based on a clear 
recognition of individual rights.” Hsün-tzu, 3rd century BC China: (UNESCO,1969, 303).  
Concern with freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and the need for uniform, 
predictable laws in the Annals of the Sui  
“Harsh penalties and rules that are not uniform must be entirely abolished. We establish laws and 
statues in advance [before inflicting punishment] in the desire that men may no longer harbour the 
intention of transgressing and that the country may have regular punishments, according to the 
principle of punishing without anger ... [F]rom the days of the preceding dynasties it had become 
the invariable practice of the authorities to employ extra-legal methods in the interrogation of 
accused persons. Sometimes they used instruments [of torture to extort confessions], such as 
great cudgels, the flogging of bound [prisoners], the wheel, the boot, ankle-crushing, and the 
bastinado with laths. Under these varied and atrocious punishments, many accused persons 
resigned themselves to making false [confessions]. Even if [those accused] were handed over to 
justice in accordance with the letter [of the law] there were always manipulations [of the laws] and 
excesses, so that no man could justify himself. Nowadays all cruel methods have been entirely 
abolished”. Legal treatise of Sui-shu, Annals of the Sui, 590-617: (UNESCO,1969, 456-457).  
Chinese human rights thinkers have also challenged the view that there is a fundamental 
incompatibility between socialism and human rights. It has been variously argued that a range of 
political priorities and goals - such as political stability and order, economic growth, development, 
poverty reduction, the achievement of basic needs and the fulfilment of economic and social rights 
- should take priority over the implementation of political and civil rights. These views have been 
articulated in a range of different contexts and at different times in history. In China, as Yu Haocheng (1995, 99) notes, the slogan that "democracy cannot feed people", and the idea that the 
implementation of the right to subsistence - which is reflected in the Chinese Constitution - 
constitutes an obstacle or barrier to the fulfilment of political and civil rights, have often prevailed. 
During the Cold War, ideological struggles over the meaning and content of human rights were 
reflected in international negotiations over international human rights standards, and socialist 
countries were often associated with an exclusive emphasis on economic and social rights. 
However, Chinese human rights scholars (eg Yu Haocheng, 1995) are increasingly challenging the 
view that economic and social rights should be prioritised over political rights. Indeed, challenges of 
this type are not new in China. In 1929, in a publication entitled "On Human Rights", Luo Longji 
wrote:  
"Of course human rights include clothing, food and many other things more important than these 
two". (Cited in Yu Haocheng, 1995, 101.) 
Furthermore, Chinese scholars are increasingly challenging the view that there is a theoretical 
incompatibility between Marx's works on the one hand, and the idea of human rights in the other. 
For example, in Xia Yong's analysis:  
"Whether one starts from the logic of the thoughts of the whole human race or that of modern 
Western thought, obviously what Marx criticised was not the normative human rights, but the 
practice of human rights in real life... [I]t is very dangerous to regard Marx's empirical evaluation 
of human rights as his whole concept of human rights... Popular views such as 'human rights 
could not be applied in China' and 'human rights are but a way of the bourgeoisie in the West' 
etc., are examples of such a danger". (Cited in Yu Haocheng, 1995, 98-99.) 
Indeed, Marx referred to the process of "political emancipation" - as reflected in the American and 
French Declarations on the Rights of Man - as "great progress" 20. As the following passage 
illustrates, Marx was a passionate defender of many civil and political rights.  
   
Karl Marx on the importance of freedom of the press 
“A free press is the eye of the spirit of the people, ever and everywhere open, the confidence 
incarnate which a people has in itself, the bond of words that links the individual to the State and 
to the world, the culture personified which transforms material struggles into spiritual struggles, 
and turns the crude and the concrete into the ideal. It is the confession without reservations of a 
people to itself …It is the spiritual mirror in which a people sees itself - and self-knowledge is the 
first prerequisite for wisdom. It is the light of the public mind that can be carried to the humblest 
dwelling more cheaply than gas can be laid on. It is universal, omnipresent, all-knowing. It is the 
ideal world constantly springing from the real world and flowing back to it, always enriched in 
spirit, in order to bring fresh life to it”.  (Karl Marx Debates on the Freedom of the Press, 
Rheinische Zeitung,1842: (UNESCO,1969, 239). 
3.3 Antecedents in Buddhist traditions of universalism and compassion  
Buddhism has many deep-rooted traditions of compassion, benevolence, universalism, tolerance 
and freedom. These traditions are applied as the basis for individual action, for inter-personal 
relations, and in public ethics. Many Buddhists believe that the ideals of the "righteous king" were 
reflected in the life, principles and actions of the great Emperor Ashoka, who ruled a huge Indian 
Empire in the third century B.C. Ashoka witnessed the violence and carnage that resulted from 
battles between his own armies, and those of the King of Kalinga (Orissa), with horror and 
remorse. Convinced that the human cost of violence and war are too high, and determined to learn the lessons of human history, and to ensure that the tragedies of war and violence would not occur 
again, Ashoka renounced all violence and war. He converted to Buddhism, and set out to expand 
his influence not through annexation and force, but through "rightousness rule" - based on the idea 
of dharma, or right conduct. He developed new principles of public ethics and civil morality - 
reflecting the values of compassion, tolerance, benevolence, and impartiality - in an attempt to 
inaugurate a new era of justice and peace. He introduced new standards relating to the need for 
the tolerance of diversity; the obligations of leaders; the administration of justice; and concern with, 
and responsibility for, the fulfilment of basic needs. These principles and standards were declared 
in stone inscriptions across the Empire. Although Ashoka was a benevolent ruler, rather than a 
democrat, or an advocate of human rights in the modern sense, his elaboration and practical 
application of these new principles and standards are the bases of his reputation as a great leader 
and statesman, and Ashoka's idea of right conduct is often ranked alongside democracy as one of 
the great ideas in human history. [Sen (1997, 1999b, 235-238), Wood (1999, 70) and Morgan 
(1996, 60,76-78,83)].  
   
Learning the lessons of human history : Ashoka’s Edicts (3rd century BC India) 
Tolerance. “Never think or say that your own religion [Dharma] is the best. Never denounce the religion of 
others”.   
Mutual respect and peaceful co-existence. “(T)here sould be the promotion of spirital strength among 
men of all sects …(T)here should be no extolling of one’s own religion or deprecating of another’s religion 
… By acting otherwise, one injures one’s own religion and also harms persons belonging to other religions 
… Concord among all religions is surely desireable  … For this purpose are employed many officers … 
(T)his is the fruit of all these measures, namely, that there are secured the promotion of one’s own 
religion...”.  
The costs of violence and war.  “(C)onquest …was characterized by killing, death, or captivity of the 
people. That is the profoundly painful and regretful feeling of the beloved of the gods….[In war] there befall 
[to pious and innocent persons] violence, death, or the deportation of beloved kindred. The friends, 
esteemed comrades, companions, and kingsmen … suffer a calamity, and that calamity proves to be a 
personal violence to them. This is the lot of all men and is considered deplorable by the beloved of the 
gods”.   
The obligations of leaders. “Just as I wish for my children that they should become endowed with all 
good and happiness of this world and of the other world, so I wish even for all men”.  
Concern with the impartiality and uniformity of the laws. “Since it is to be desired that there should be 
uniformity in law and also uniformity in justice, from this time forward such is my injunction …”   
The right of appeal. “To men on whom sentence has already been passed and who are in confinement or 
have been condemned to death, three days have been granted by me as their rightful respite in order that 
(during that interval) some of their relatives may submit appeals for their life …”.   
Concern with, and responsibility for, the fulfilment of basic needs. “Everywhere, two kinds of medical 
treatment have been established…namely, medical treatment for men and medical treatment for animals. 
Medicinal herbs useful for men and useful for animals have been imported and planted wherever they 
were not to be found. Similarly, roots and fruits have also been imported and planted wherever they were 
not to be found. On the roads trees have been planted and wells have been dug for the use of men and animals”.   
“On the roads, banyan trees have been planted by me so that they should give shade to men and animals. 
Mango-groves have been planted. At every half krosa, I have caused wells to be dug. Rest-houses for the 
night have been built. Many water points have been provided in various places for the use of men and 
animals”   
Source: (UNESCO, 1969; 98, 177, 179, 240, 242, 402-3, 465)  
  
His Holiness The Fourteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet (1999) has highlighted the relevance of ancient 
Buddhist principles to ethical reflection and action in the contemporary world. In Ancient Wisdom, 
Modern World, he suggests that that the capacity of all people to experience happiness and 
suffering is a fundamental aspect of the human condition and that the recognition of this shared 
capacity provides a foundation for modern views about shared human interests and common 
humanity. The notion of universalism is central to the Dalai Lama's approach and the Tibetan 
phrase of shen dug-ngal-wa-la mi-sö-pa (the "inability to bear the sight of another's suffering"/ the 
capacity to empathise with and participate in the suffering of others) is also directly relevant. 
According to the Dalai Lama, compassion should be undifferentiated and universal in scope and - 
given the tendency of individuals to ignore the needs and rights of others and to focus on their own 
narrow preferences - ethics is necessary as a means of broadening the sphere of individual 
empathy and concern. The practical application of ethical principles can help to ensure that the 
capacity of others to experience happiness and suffering is taken into account in individual thought 
and action. In the modern world, the growing acceptance of the universality of human rights reflects 
the need for this wider perspective. The experience of Nazi atrocities in Europe in the twentieth 
century demonstrated the necessity of legislation and international conventions as safeguards 
against future atrocities, to secure peace and to avoid suffering and pain. In addition, the Dalai 
Lama has called for a new global ethic that can help to develop "a sense of universal responsibility 
- of the universal dimension of our every act and of the equal right of all others to happiness and 
not to suffer" and to cultivate a culture in which "all human diversity is acknowledged and the rights 
of all are respected" (1999, 68, 171, 226).  
Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the movement for democratic reform in contemporary Burma, has 
also invoked ancient Buddhist principles as a foundation for modern ideas about human rights.  
   
Aung San Suu Kyi on Freedom from Fear 
  “Most Burmese are familiar with the four a-gati, the four kinds of corruption … [P]erhaps the worst of the 
four is bhaya-gati, for not only does bhaya, fear, stifle and slowly destroy all sense of right and wrong, it so 
often lies at the root of the other three kinds of corruption …[F]ear of being surpassed, humiliated or injured 
in some way can provide the impetus for ill will. And it would be difficult to dispel ignorance unless there 
is freedom to pursue the truth unfettered by fear. With so close a relationship between fear and corruption it 
is little wonder that in any society where fear is rife corruption in all forms becomes deeply entrenched 
…The effort necessary to remain uncorrupted in an environment where fear is an integral part of everyday 
existence is not immediately apparent to those fortunate enough to live in states governed by the rule of law. Just laws do not merely prevent corruption by meting out impartial punishment to offenders. They also help 
to create a society in which people can fulfil the basic requirements necessary for the preservation of human 
dignity without recourse to corrupt practices. When there are no such laws, the burden of upholding the 
principles of justice and common decency falls on the ordinary people …The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of the United Nations proclaims that “every individual and every organ of society” should 
strive to promote the basic rights and freedoms to which all human beings regardless of race, nationality or 
religion are entitled. But as long as there are governments whose authority is founded on coercion rather 
than on the mandate of the people … concerted international action to protect and promote human rights 
remain at best a partially realized struggle. There will continue to be arenas of struggle where victims of 
oppression have to draw on their own inner resources to defend their inalienable rights as members of the 
human family.”   
 Cited in (Agosín, 1999, 80-84). 
3.4 Antecedents in Indian traditions of universalism, tolerance and diversity  
The High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that the search for unity in cultural diversity 
is a particular responsibility of the United Nations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has 
called on all people world-wide to do our part "to make possible a global civilization that is defined 
by its tolerance of dissent, its celebration of cultural diversity, and its insistence on fundamental, 
universal human rights" (Robinson, 1998). These ideas have foundations in deep-rooted Indian 
traditions of tolerance, mutual respect and peaceful coexistence. The ancient idea of unity in 
diversity reflects the ancient Hindu emphasis on oneness and truth. This idea was articulated and 
interpreted by the great Indian leader Mahatma Gandhi. For Gandhi, the search for truth is the 
search for human oneness. In contrast to the ideas of cultural hegemony, Gandhi argued that the 
message conveyed by the idea of unity in diversity is one of universalism, tolerance, mutual 
respect, and peaceful co-existence. Ghandi's life and actions reflected the hope that a modern, free 
and independent India would be constructed on the foundation stones of this ancient idea.  
   
Building a culture of tolerance, peaceful co-existence and mutual respect:  
   Mahatma Gandhi on the Indian tradition of unity in diversity. 
“I think that we have to find unity in diversity…we are all children of one and the same God and, 
therefore, absolutely equal”.  
“The need of the moment is not one religion, but mutual respect and tolerance of the devotees of 
the different religions. We want to reach not the dead level, but unity in diversity. Any attempt to 
root out traditions, effects of heredity, climate and other surroundings is not only bound to fail, but 
is a sacrilege”.  
“The Gujarat Vidyapith hopes to build a new culture based on the traditions of the past and 
enriched by the experience of later times. It stands for the synthesis of the different cultures that 
have come to stay in India. This synethesis will naturally be of the Swadeshi [Indian] type where 
each culture is assessed its legitimate place, and not of the American pattern, where one 
dominant culture absorbs the rest, and where the aim is not towards harmony, but towards an 
artificial and forced unity”.   Cited in King (1999, 325&305) 
Kautilya, freedom and the obligations of rulers  
Sen [(1997) and (1999b, 235-238)] has highlighted the importance of Kautilya - a contemporary of 
Aristotle, who lived in the fourth century B.C.- in thinking about the cross-cultural foundations of the 
idea of human rights. Although Kautilya's writings are often cited as proof that freedom and 
tolerance were not valued in the Indian classical tradition, Sen offers an alternative interpretation. 
Noting that "the focus on freedom is clear enough in Kautilya as far as the upper classes are 
concerned", Sen suggests that in so far as a view of the good life emerges from Kautilya's writing, 
it is a view that is entirely consistent with a freedom-valuing ethical system. Furthermore, Sen 
suggests that Kautilya's focus on freedom for the upper classes is not so very different from the 
ancient Greek focus on free men, as opposed to slaves or women.  
"Kautilya is no democrat, no egalitarian, no general promoter of everyone's freedom. And yet, 
when it comes to the characterisation of what the most favoured people - the upper classes - 
should get, freedom figures quite prominently. The denial of personal liberty of the upper classes 
(the so-called "Arya") is seen as unacceptable. Indeed, regular penalties, some of them heavy, 
are specified for the taking of such adults or children in indenture - even though the slavery of the 
existing slaves is seen as perfectly acceptable" [Sen (1997, 37)]. 
Conventionally, Kautilya is recognised not for his influence on the idea of freedom, but for his views 
on governance, the obligations of rulers and political economy. Kautilya's main work Arthashastra 
("economic science") was profoundly influential. In interpreting this work, Sen suggests that 
Kautilya attaches little importance to political or economic equality, and that his vision of the good 
society is strongly stratified according to lines of class and caste. In his attempts to promote order 
in the kingdom and to ensure the happiness of subjects, Kautilya is often remembered as a 
"benevolent autocrat", whose power is to be maximized through proper organisation - if necessary, 
through the violation of freedoms. Yet Sen suggests that the Arthashastra presents ideas and 
suggestions on practical subjects such as famine prevention and administrative effectiveness that 
remain relevant even today. Kautilya recognises the obligations of the king to "provide the orphans, 
the aged, the infirm, the afflicted, and the helpless with maintenance," along with providing 
"subsistence to helpless women when they are carrying and also to the [newborn] children they 
give birth to". Clearly, this acknowledgement by a benevolent autocrat of the benefits of 
undertaking paternalistic state assistance to the poor and destitute, is a far cry from valuing the 
freedom of all people to decide how they wish to live, or from the modern idea of human rights. 
Nevertheless, in tracing the historical antecedents of the idea of economic and social rights, the 
significance of the obligations of government to poor and vulnerable groups - and of the value of 
government action in relation to famine relief - cannot be denied.  
Traditions of tolerance within the Moghul Empire  
In addition, in re-appraising the work of certain non-Western thinkers and actors in relation to 
modern ideas about human rights, Sen (1997, 37) has suggested that the Moghul emperor Akbar, 
who ruled between 1556 and 1605, was one of the "powerful expositors and practitioners of 
tolerance of diversity in India". Although Akbar was not a democrat or a proponent of the modern 
idea of human rights in the modern sense, he nevertheless valued religious and social diversity, arguing against religious interference, and for state policies of religious tolerance. Underlining the 
lessons of human history, Akbar noted:  
"In the past .. . to our shame, we forced many Hindus to adopt the faith of our ancestors. Now it 
has become clear to me, that in our troubled world so full of contradictions, it cannot be wisdom to 
assert the unique truth of one faith over another. The wise person makes justice his guide and 
learns form all. Perhaps in this way the door may be opened again, whose key has been lost" 
[cited in Wood (1999, 77)]. 
In addition to emphasising the importance of tolerance in relation to belief and practice, Akbar 
advocated the fair and non-sectarian treatment of subjects, and attempted to build on the diverse 
traditions represented in the Empire - Muslims, Hindus, Jains, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians and 
others - to formulate a "synthesis" of religious views. As Sen points out, these ideas may not have 
been so easily tolerated in parts of sixteenth century Europe, where the Inquisition was being 
pursued. Indeed, despite the vies of some exponents of Hindu politics in contemporary India, the 
tolerant nature of much of Moghul rule has often been recognised in Indian thought. For example, 
Sri Aurobindo stated that:  
"The Moghul empire was a great and magnificent construction and an immense amount of 
political genius and talent was employed in its creation and maintenance. It was splendid, 
powerful and beneficent and, it may be added, in spite of Aurangzeb's fanatical zeal, infinitely 
more liberal and tolerant in religion than any Medieval or contemporary European kingdom or 
empire" [cited in Sen (1997, 38)]. 
Traditions of universalism, tolerance and equality in the Sikh religion  
The Sikh religion has also made an important contribution to the contemporary idea of human 
rights through its emphasis on the ideas of universalism, tolerance and equality. Indeed, many 
Sikh's believe that the modern concern for human rights for all reflects the messages of Guru 
Gobind Singh ("Recognise the oneness of the human family"), Guru Nanak ("[F]orget all ideas of 
caste or race") and Guru Amar Das (who condemned the practices that adversely affected the 
interests of women, including the practice of Sati and female infanticide [Singh (1990, 11) and 
Kaur-Singh (1990, 21)]. Hence one Sikh scholar has expressed the view that:  
"In stressing the equality of all human beings, men and women, their emphasis on social and 
religious tolerance and their brave and forthright attack on all notions of caste, class or racial 
superiority [the Gurus] gave us, in a sense, the forerunner of the United Nations ideal, the key, 
not only to sanity and survival in the world today, but also to the positive realisation that different 
cultures, different ways of life, are not barriers between people, but gateways to a fuller 
understanding and enrichment of life itself" [Singh: cited in Nesbitt (1996, 121)]. 
Contributions to the UNESCO Human Rights Research Project (1947-8)  
In response to UNESCO's invitation in 1947 to thinkers and writers from different countries and 
cultures around the world to submit their ideas about human rights, S.V. Puntambekar from Nagpur 
University contributed a piece on The Hindu Concept of Human Rights. He stated that:  
"Great thinkers like Manu and Buddha have laid emphasis on what should be the assurances 
necessary for man and what should be the virtues possessed by man. They have propounded a 
code as it were of ten essential human freedoms and controls or virtues necessary for good life. 
They are not only basic, but more comprehensive in their scope than those mentioned by any 
other modern thinker. They emphasise five freedoms or social assurances and five individual 
possessions or virtues. The five social freedoms are (I) freedom from violence (Ahimsa), (2) 
freedom from want (Asteya), (3) freedom from exploitation (Aparigraha), (4) freedom from violation or dishonour (Avyabhichara) and (5) freedom from early death and disease (Armitatva 
and Aregya). The five individual possessions or virtues are (I) absence of intolerance (Akrodha), 
(2) Compassion or fellow feeling (Bhutadaya, Adreha), (3) Knowledge (Jnana, Vidya), (4) 
freedom of thought and conscience (Satya, Sunrta) and (5) freedom from fear and frustration or 
despair (Pravrtti, Abhaya, Dhrti)" [Puntambekar: UNESCO (1948, 197)]. 
Mahatma Gandhi also responded to the UNESCO invitation, by emphasising the importance of 
obligation as a basis of rights.  
"I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights to be deserved and preserved came from 
duty well done. Thus the very right to live accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship of 
the world. From this one fundamental statement, perhaps it is easy enough to define the duties of 
Man and Woman and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be first performed. 
Every other right can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for" [Gandhi: UNESCO 
(1948, 18)]. 
Ghandi and the non-violent path to human rights  
Gandhi's life and work demonstrated that ancient teachings of non-injury, non-violence, peaceful 
co-existence and mutual respect can be successfully applied in the struggle for rights in the 
modern world - in struggles against foreign domination, economic exploitation, the caste system, 
and religious and ethnic supremecy, and in struggles for national independence, freedom and 
human rights. New campaigns that aimed to improve the position of women and to fulfil the basic 
human rights of the so-called "untouchable" caste - including rights to education for girls and boys, 
rights to access water from public wells, and rights to use temples for worship - grew into national 
movements under Gandhi's leadership. In leading these struggles and building these campaigns, 
Gandhi explictly appealed to the idea of rights.  
"I wish I could persuade everybody that civil disobedience is the inherent right of a citizen...Civil 
disobedience...becomes a sacred duty when the State has become lawless, or ... corrupt ...[The 
right to civil disobedience] is a birthright that cannot be surrendered without surrender of one's 
self-respect" [cited in (King, 1999, 286-7)]. 
In addition, Gandhi appealed to elements of the diverse range of Indian religions - including 
appeals to Hindu messages of unity in diversity, Sikh messages of common humanity, the 
Christian message of universal love, Islamic messages of universalism, obligation and justice, 
Buddhist message of compassion, tolerance and peace, and Jain messages of noninjury and 
nonviolence. The ancient Jain principle of the the renunciation of intent to injure was central to 
Gandhi's philosophy and strategies for action. Ghandi argued passsionately that struggles and 
campaigns for justice, freedoms and rights, the means must always be as pure as the ends.  
"I have never believed, and I do not now believe, that the end justifies the means. On the 
contrary, it is my firm conviction that there is an intimate connection between the end and the 
means, so much so that you cannot achieve a good end by bad means" [cited in King (1999; 
280).] 
For Gandhi, the principle that the means must be as pure as the ends is a matter of morality, but 
also of tactics. In order to guarantee that the intended results will be secured, the means of action 
should always embody and/or reveal the ends of action - the purpose or goal to be achieved. 
Arguing that the means or method of a struggle or campaign ought never to be separated from the 
results or ends to be achieved, Gandhi applied these ideas as a basis for action in struggles and 
campaigns for independence, freedoms and rights. His framework for ethics and action revolved 
around the ideas of ahimsa (noninjury/ nonviolence) - the means of action, "a kind of power whose 
essence is nonviolence"; and satyagraha, "the power of truth", a "process of educating public 
opinion such [sic] that it covers all the elements of society and in the end makes itself irresistible". As a consequence of this process, the power in ahimsa is tranformed into political action and the 
intended end of action - that is, truth - is secured (King, 1999;14-15,309).  
Gandhi's life and work demonstrate the power and efficacy of nonviolence in struggles for change 
and reform. At the end of the twentieth century, and the beginning of the twenty-first, the conviction 
that non-violence is an effective and practical alternative to force changes in ideas, laws and 
systems of governments, is at the forefront of ideas about human rights. According to one author, 
"[t]he teachings of Gandhi emphasise his belief that human beings have at their disposal the power 
to settle group conflicts without violence". This idea of latent "people's power" was an important 
influence on the "revolutions" of the late 1980s in Eastern Europe, and is central to the ideas of the 
Czech thinker and human rights campaigner, Václav Havel. It is influential in human rights 
campaigns in diverse countries including Burma and Mexico (King,1999,16,369-477).  
3.5 Some Christian and Jewish perspectives: Rights-based strategies and the non-violent 
struggle against racism in the United States; liberation theology; and the vision of 
liberation.  
   
Discrimination, racism and the human rights agenda 
Discrimination and racism are a central human rights issue in many countries. A recent report by 
Amnesty International noted that although the USA was founded in the name of democracy, 
political and legal equality, and individual freedom - and despite its claims to international 
leadership in the field of human rights, and its many institutions to protect individual civil liberties - 
the USA is failing to deliver the fundamental promise of rights for all. In certain cases, the 
authorities have failed to prevent repeated violations of basic human rights, and despite serious 
attempts this century to overcome racism, the USA has not succeeded in eradicating the 
discriminatory treatment of blacks (African Americans), Latinos and other minority groups. Slavery 
was formally abolished in 1865, but racial segregation remained legal until the 1960s, and despite 
long and proud traditions of struggle for anti-racism and civil rights, surveys suggest that many in 
the USA are unfamiliar with the rights they possess, and do not appreciate that the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights are there to protect everyone in the USA from abuse of power by 
government.     [Amnesty International (1998, 1-13)] 
In the US in the 1950s and 1960s, Gandhi's vision of the non-violent struggle for human rights was 
taken up by the symbolic leader of the civil rights movement, The Revd. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 
In reflecting upon "overcoming, without monstrous and widespread violence, the perversity of racial 
injustice", King argued that the nonviolent resistance of Gandhi was the "only morally and 
practically sound method open to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom". The "first 
principle for the civil rights movement was that the 'means must be as pure as the end'". King also 
supported the Ghandian proposition that "a pure motive can never justify impure or violent action" 
and the nonviolent principle that "ends and means must cohere". He argued that non-violence was 
a practical and effective - as well as a moral - alternative for the stuggle for rights and freedom, and 
that non-violent means are the only route by which lasting bitterness can be avoided, cycles of 
violence and retribution can be broken, and a culture of mutual respect, reconciliation and peace 
can be constructed. By adopting nonviolent struggle as a form of social protest and mobilization for 
legal reform, King hoped to prevent white citizens from feeling defeated and humiliated, and to avoid the temptation for blacks to take on "the mentality of victors" (King, 1999; 96, 168, 282, 284). 
Hence:  
"Seven years after India attained its freedom, on the other side of the globe a nonviolent protest 
began that was based on the same principles and understanding of power. It soon evolved into a 
regional mass movement that sought to persuade a nation to confront its institutionalized racism 
and change the laws that upheld it. Within one decade, major national legislation had destroyed 
the legal support for the racial caste system in the United States" (King, 1999; 197). 
Ideas of universalism and interdependence were also at the centre of King's agenda for reform. 
These ideas were reflected in King's Last Sunday Sermon. In this revealing statement of faith and 
hope, King made reference to the message of universalism and interdependence articulated by the 
poet John Donne, and made these ideas relevant to modern conditions.  
"We are challenged to develop a world perspective. No individual can live alone, no nation can 
live alone, and anyone who feels that he can live alone is sleeping through a revolution. The 
world in which we live is geographically one. The challenge that we face today is to make it one in 
terms of brotherhood" [cited in King (1999, 518).] 
In addition, in leading and building the campaign for civil rights, King invoked American democratic 
traditions in support of the claims of black people in America for civil rights. As King declared in his 
speech to the mass meeting at Holt Street Baptist Church, Montgomery, 5 December 1955: "The 
great glory of democracy is the right to protest for rights" (King, 1999, 314). King located the claims 
for civil rights for black people squarely within the tradtions of the political revolutions in Europe and 
America in the eighteenth and nineteeth centuries. Discriminatory laws denied black people their 
rights as human beings (King, 1999, 142-3) and the struggle against exclusion from political power 
and for full political particpation was a struggle for equal rights and opportunities based on the 
ideals established in American political and consitutional history.  
"They are seeking to save the soul of America. They are taking our whole nation back to those 
great wells of democracy which were dug deep by the founding fathers in the formulation of the 
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. In sitting down at the lunch counters, they are 
in reality standing up for the best in the American dream" [cited in King (1999, 315)]. 
Finally, in leading the mass movement for civil rights, King built on the deeply- rooted religious 
traditions of hope, faith, liberation and resistance of the African-American church. As one veteran 
of the civil rights movement explains, traditions of religious resistance by black people in America 
can be traced back through the nineteenth, eighteenth and seventeenth centuries. These traditions 
had their origins in rebellions on slave ships, and were fuelled by the experience of slavery.  
"The tradition of black, Southern grass-roots protest and resistance - starting with the leaders of 
slave uprisings and rebellions, moving on to untold numbers of slave preachers, and up through 
the many local figures whose actions taken together would comprise the mid-twentieth century 
civil rights movement - started in the church ... King brought to the practice of preaching his deep 
roots in an historic church ... With strong biblical mandates for the overthrowing of injustice, there 
evolved a vocabulary that formed the basis for the modern quest for freedom" (King, 1999, 98-
99). 
The movement for civil rights in America, and the life and work of Martin Luther King, symbolise the 
important role played by religious hope and faith, the vision of liberation, and traditions of religious 
resistance and action, in the movement for human rights. Millions of thinkers and activists from all 
over the world have been inspired and motivated by Old Testament traditions of liberation and 
hope and New Testament traditions of the liberation of the oppressed (e.g. Luke 4) and special 
concern for the poor and needy - in which the poor are said to be specially blessed and deserving 
of special concern (e.g. the Sermon on the Mount, Mathew 5-7, Luke 6:20 and Mark: 10:21). For 
example, in Guatemala, the thinker and activist Rigoberta Menchú, who has been at the forefront 
of campaigns for the human rights of indigenous groups, has spoken of the motivation and inspiration from her Christian faith and commitment (1984, 141). The liberation theology movement 
that emerged in Latin America in the 1960s also built on these traditions. Religious thinkers such 
as Gustavo Gutierréz and Leonardo Boff set out to examine the spectrum of Christian faith from 
the standpoint of the poor and oppressed and to establish a clear Biblical basis for action for and 
by the poor. The liberation theologoy movement now has millions of followers in many different 
countries throughout the world and is an important force in campaigns for human rights, particularly 
campaigns for the human rights of poor and marginalized groups [Boff and Boff (1987) and 
Sigmund (1993)]. In South Africa, the role of the Christian Church in the stuggle for human rights 
and against apartheid is symolised by the religious and human rights thinker, Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu, who has conveyed a message of justice, peace, reconciliation and healing, in the struggle for 
human rights. The former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, has repeatedly 
acknowledged the important role of many different religions in the struggle for human rights in 
South Africa, and - in paying tribute to the contribution of Jewish people to the struggle for human 
rights in South Africa - has highlighted the importance of the messages of hope and liberation 
inspired by the Old Testament.  
   
“(T)he Passover festival, commemorating the emancipation from slavery of the children of Israel 
in Ancient times, carries a message of universal human significance that has moved millions 
throughout history, transcending all boundaries of geography, race, or creed. The figure of Moses, 
the liberator, has served as an inspiration to every people who have been compelled to struggle 
for their liberation. The immortal words he spoke to Pharoh, “let my people go!” reverberate 
though the corridors of time” [Mandela (1992, 159)]. 
3.6 Antecedents in African traditions and cultures and the need for new theoretical 
frameworks  
Human rights activists and thinkers have challenged the view that the modern idea of human rights 
is alien to traditional African values and practices and irrelevant to African needs and priorities. As 
Annan has remarked:  
"I am aware of the fact that some view [the concept of human rights] as a luxury of the rich 
countries for which Africa is not ready. I know that others treat it as an imposition if not a plot by 
the industrizliaed west. I find these thoughts truly demeaning of the bearing for human dignity that 
presides in every African heart" [Annan (1997b): cited in Bankie et. al. (1998,v)]. 
In responding to relativism, human rights thinkers and activists often argue that elements of 
traditional African thought can provide foundations for modern theories of human rights. For 
example, Neto analyses the question of the origins of human rights in the context of Angolan 
society, noting that:  
"In seeking to understand humanity we should not divorce the être humain from his/her culture ... 
In our area, the world is seen as built on a foundation of circulating energies, in which the vital 
principle is the anima. Thus the origin of animism. Our philosophy seeks to establish harmony 
and equilibrium amongst anima ... What is fundamental to our culture is respect for others and the 
complementarity of differences. In this context, to define African human rights is to recognise the 
harmony, dignity, equality and inalienable rights of all members of the human family" (1998, 34). 
Wiredu identifies the presence of many human rights values in traditional Akkan thought. The term 
Akkan refers to a group of related languages found in West Africa and to the people who speak 
them, living predominantly in Ghana and parts of Côte d'Ivoire. He suggests that:  "Akkan thought recognised the right of a newborn to be nursed and educated, the right of an adult 
to a plot of land from the ancestral holdings, the right of any well-defined unit of political 
organization to self-government, the right of all to have a say in the enstoolment or destoolment 
of their chiefs of their elders and to participate in the shaping of governmental policies, the right of 
all to freedom of thought and expression in all matters, political, religious, and metaphysical, the 
right of everybody to trial before punishment, the right of a person to remain at any locality or to 
leave, and so on" (1990, 257). 
Deng argues that certain human rights values can be identified in the traditions and practices of the 
Dinka of Southern Sudan. In his view, "there can be hardly be any doubt ... that some notions of 
human rights are defined and observed by the Dinka as part of their total value system" (1990, 
271). While it is true that traditional Dinka society was highly stratified and characterised by 
inequalities, notions of human rights and human dignity nevertheless formed an integral part of 
Dinka value systems - in terms of both the overriding goals for life and ideals for relationships 
between people. Deng suggests that these deeply-rooted values could be of practical application 
today, providing a basis for cross-cultural communication in Sudan, and enriching the process of 
universalization in the promotion of human rights. Others have emphasised that the ideas of the 
fulfilment of basic needs and distributive justice are deep-rooted in many African societies and 
traditions, and these ideas are often cited as antecedents of modern theories of economic and 
social rights. For example, Kazenambo suggests that in some cultures in Namibia, land was 
distributed to families for use on the basis of need. While recognising that societies were stratified - 
not only by age and sex, but also into castes of nobles, freemen and slaves - and that a certain 
proportion surplus food was given to the chief, Kazenambo notes that the Chief's control over 
surplus food was a "stewardship" on behalf of the group. Food was distributed for ritual occasions 
or stored for periods of poor harvest in the future, and Kazenambo expresses the view that 
mechanisms of this type reflected the principle (if not always the practice) that each individual was 
guaranteed adequate land for his or her sustenance (1998,118).  
The importance of the oral tradition is particularly influential in Africa, and important values are 
often conveyed by the spoken word. Human rights activists and thinkers have emphasised the 
importance of citing those traditional African proverbs that are consistent with, and supportive of, 
modern notions of human rights.  
   
African proverbs 
Equality. “Men are not like bundles of millet, among which it is advantageous to choose the 
biggest.” (The need to treat all men with equality. Against chiefs who have personal preferences. 
Songhai proverb).  
Justice. “The poor man pleads, the judge listens”. (Do not be your own justiciar; all are entitled to 
justice. Amharic proverb, Ethiopia).  
“Do not accept a verdict given in your absence”. (Djerma-Songhai proverb, Africa)  
“One should not oppress with one’s size or might”. (It is wrong for a strong man to oppress the 
weak. Akan proverb, Ghana.)  
“Whatever is unjust towards others is not worthy of the name Justice”. (Djerma-Songhai proverb, 
Africa)  Diversity. “You cannot insist that everyone shall behave in the same way”.  (Burundi proverb)  
Reciprocity. “One who does not wish to be abused, does not abuse” (Ibo proverb, Nigeria)  
Respect. “Trampling on another’s right to seek your own ends in disappointment”  (Akan proverb, 
Ghana)  
Respect for women and the girl child “Whether man or woman, rich or poor and so on, there 
are no basic differences; all are humans born of woman and doomed to die” (Mongo proverb, 
Congo)  
“When a python is killed, men go to see, and when a leopard is killed, they also go and admire, 
for both are noble beasts. Likewise with man: whether a woman is delivered of a daughter or 
gives birth to a son, it is the same; both are human. Whether a man be rich or poor, we should 
hold him in affection, for he is man.” (Mongo proverb, Congo).  
“I would have you know that another person’s right is a live coal; if you take hold of it, it will burn 
your hand”. (Djerma-Songhai proverb, Africa)  
Protection of the poor. “Never deprive a poor man of his possessions” (Burundi proverb).   
Limits on the power of the chief.  “Where man is denied, the devil himself loses his rights. (A 
protest against oppression by the chief and a warning to him. The Fulani say that a chief whose 
subjects are all slaves is not a chief, because nobody dares to tell him the truth. Power is a 
dialogue. Hala, in Fulani, means “right”, but also, literally,“speech”, word”, “logos”. Fulani 
proverb).   
UNESCO (1969; 43, 119, 189, 240, 272, 302, 390, 451, 452, 513) 
The view that the modern idea of human rights values is irrelevant to contemporary African needs 
and priorities has also been widely challenged. It is often argued that the lessons of the historic 
struggle for human rights in South Africa provide overwhelming evidence of the undeniable 
relevance of international human rights standards to the African Continent.  
   
Are human rights a Western cultural bias?   
The lessons of the history of the struggle for human rights in South Africa 
The history of the struggle for human rights in South Africa illustrates the relevance of 
international human rights standards to all people, in different countries and cultures, and 
challenges many myths about the “Western” nature of human rights. Nelson Mandela has 
highlighted the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) for this struggle. 
The principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration served to vindicate the justice of the 
struggle against apartheid, and raised the challenge that freedom, once achieved, would be 
dedicated to the implementation of human rights standards (1998).   
“It is not a widely known fact that during the Second World War, after Churchill and Roosevelt 
concluded the Atlantic Charter, the then-president of the ANC, Dr. A.B. Xuma, appointed a blue-
ribbon committee of African thinkers and political leaders to draw up a charter for Africa, applying the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter to the African continent. That document, titled “The 
African Claims” remains one of the most important statements of the central values subscribed to 
by the ANC. Anyone who reads it, even today, will agree that it is one of the best contributions to 
this universal human rights culture emanating from our country” (1991, 78).  
The United Nations was involved in human rights issues arising from the South African situation 
from 1946 onwards. Violations of human rights were investigated and apartheid was denounced 
by the UN General Assembly as a crime against humanity (Reedy, 1986, 36). This action proved 
that the systematic violation of human rights in South Africa was not a “domestic” matter - falling 
within the aegis of “national sovereignty” - but was of legitimate and legal concern to the entire 
world body. Within South Africa, the principle that international concern with human rights does 
not stop at geographical boundaries was well understood by the victims of the apartheid regime. 
Accusations of “Western bias” were rejected on the grounds that all people are entitled to human 
rights. As the South African Constitutional Judge Albie Sachs has noted:   
“In South Africa, it was not people whose ancestors had come from Europe who had fought most 
consistently for what is called Western democracy, but people of African and Asian origin. While 
most people of European descent were extolling the notion of racial dictatorship in either 
repressive or benign form, the idea of non-racial democracy was kept alive in the prisons, the 
underground and in exile largely by blacks. In the light of our history, therefore, nothing was to be 
gained by fixing the label “Western” to the word “democracy” ... (1998, 40-41).  
Following the abolition of the apartheid system, The Bill of Rights entrenched in the new South 
African Constitution (1996) is a cornerstone of democracy, affirming the values of human dignity, 
equality and freedom, and enshrining the rights of all people. These include rights to life and 
property, to freedom and security of the person; rights to freedom of religion, belief, opinion and 
expression; rights to peaceful assembly and to freedom of association and movement; rights to 
equality before the law, to a fair trial; and rights that relate to detention and imprisonment. Rights 
relating to the freedom to choose work and labour relations, to culture and information, to the 
environment, and children’s rights, are also included. In addition, The Bill of Rights recognises 
economic and social rights - including the rights to adequate housing, healthcare, food, water and 
social security, education - and the responsibility of the State, within available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of these rights. Finally, slavery, racial and sexual 
discrimination, and the deprivation of citizenship, are prohibited. The need to implement these 
human rights, and to create a sustainable culture of human rights, is now a priority in South 
Africa.   
The role of international human rights standards in the struggle against apartheid, and the 
centrality of the ideas of democracy and human rights in the new South Africa, demonstrates the 
importance and relevance of the idea of human rights in Africa, and provides a historic example. 
To quote Albie Sachs again:  
“Democracy and human rights do not belong to any part of the world, even less to any race. They 
may be likened to a single giant tree with roots in all the regions of the world, nurtured by the 
sufferings and struggles of people everywhere. Just as the world helped the struggle against 
apartheid and for democracy and human rights in South Africa, so did the South African struggle, 
the negotiated settlement, the policy of reconciliation and the process of transformation help the 
world. The tree of democracy in the world grows stronger because of its roots in our continent; our 
continent gains strength because it is organically connected to that tree” (1998, 45). 
African influences and the evolving human rights agenda  The modern idea of human rights is not static, but is dynamic and evolving, and African concerns 
and priorities are influencing the contemporary agenda in many different ways. For example, 
African perspectives have highlighted the need for new thinking about accountability in the field of 
human rights. In Nigeria, the role and responsibilities of the major multinational oil companies in 
respect of human rights violations has come to the fore in the wake of the "Ogoni crisis" and the 
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. Given the dominant position of oil producing companies in the 
national economy, the need for a broader concept of international obligation in relation to the 
protection and promotion of human rights has come to the fore. Although international human 
rights law is formally only binding on states, increased emphasis is being placed on the 
responsibilities of other actors, and new standards of corporate responsibility are beginning to 
emerge21. Similarly, recent thinking about the role and responsibility of the International Financial 
Institutions in relation to international human rights standards - civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural - has been influenced by African perspectives, and the view that international financial 
institutions are not exempt from obligations in relation to all human rights - economic, social, 
cultural, civil and political - is becoming increasingly influential22. African human rights thinkers and 
activists have long-since emphasised the importance of economic and social rights, helping to 
highlight this concern in international fora, and the idea of the indivisibility and interdependence of 
all human rights is now a crucial element in defining the nature and scope of international human 
rights standards23. For example, the Senegalese human rights advocate, and Secretary-General 
of Amnesty International, Pierre Sané, has rejected the idea that economic development is faster 
where free speech and other rights are constrained, commenting that "[n]owhere has it been 
demonstrated that in order to develop you need to torture". In addition, Sané has highlighted the 
centrality of economic and social rights to the civil and political rights agenda.  
"The World Bank, through its economic programme, is imposing an economic order that means 
reducing social rights, by cutting health and education policies. Governments have to restructure 
their economies in order to pay back their debts and they use force in order to impose their views 
... We [at Amnesty International] continue to focus on political killings and disappearances... But 
those violations are [often] committed against people who want to change their society, who want 
to change economic relations, to change social conditions, so by working for them we are 
indirectly working for the indivisibility of human rights ... While we are not working directly with 
economic rights ... [m]ore and more ... [there is] a convergence of all NGOs working in 
development and human rights24". 
Hundreds of millions of people in Africa have inadequate access to basic necessities such as food, 
jobs, water, shelter, education, health care and a healthy environment, and African perspectives 
have been important in bringing the idea of extreme poverty as a violation of human rights - and 
the human right to development - to the centre of the international agenda. The recognition that the 
implementation of many human rights is not cost-free - together with the existence of resource 
constraints in many African countries - has resulted in a growing acceptance of the view that high 
levels of international debt constitute an obstacle to the achievement of human rights25. Indeed, 
the identification of specific obstacles to the full implementation of all human rights - including the 
full implementation of economic and social rights and the right to the development - and of the 
special problems of the developing countries in achieving these objectives, are now important 
elements of human rights analysis and fact-finding. The experiences of resource-constrained 
African countries has influenced recent thinking about the role and responsibilities of developed 
countries in promoting and protecting all human rights world-wide. The importance of the 
international obligation to assist has been highlighted and this priority is giving rise to new thinking about human rights, development, international co-operation, assistance and aid.  
   
The evolving idea of human rights and the need for new theoretical frameworks  
The evolving idea of human rights raises the need for new theoretical frameworks in which the 
proposition that poverty is a violation of human rights can be analysed more adequately. For 
example, Mrs. Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for human rights (1997, 6) has stated 
that "(p)overty itself is a violation of numerous basic human rights". In what type of theoretical 
framework can this proposition be made sense of? This is a difficult and controversial question and 
raises many complex debates. Some authors have argued that poverty is not a denial of basic 
human rights, and that the counter-claim is of rhetorical value only. In contrast, Sen's work on 
freedom, rights and capabilities contributes to the development of a framework in which the 
proposition that extreme poverty is a violation of basic human rights can be analysed more 
adequately. The emerging paradigm shift in ethics, economics and development away from welfare 
and utilitarianism - and towards capabilities and rights - is central to this debate26.  
   
   
The evolving concept of human rights: The need for new theoretical frameworks. 
Sen has suggested that the assessment of ‘value’ in ethics and economics ought to go well 
beyond utilities, and that the evaluation of states of affairs ought to take explicit note of the 
violation and fulfilment of rights (1996, 26). However, in Sen’s view, two common frameworks for 
rights-based reasoning - welfarist frameworks on the one hand, and deontological frameworks on 
the other - are unsuitable. Welfarist frameworks (including utilitarianism) are unsuitable because 
they are based on a narrow conception of human well-being, and fail to give intrinsic weight to the 
violation and fulfilment of individual rights. In contrast, deontological frameworks do give intrinsic 
weight to the violation and fulfilment of individual rights. However, these are based on an 
outcome-independent characterisation of rights, and are associated with the idea that rights are 
absolute constraints that cannot be traded-off under any circumstances. In Sen’s view, this idea is 
“fundamentally defective”. The claim that moral evaluation can be indifferent to the consequences 
of the exercise of rights is “implausible” and is undermined by problems of “multilateral 
interdependence” that arise “in valuing rights in a society” (1984, 311-315). In addition, 
deontological frameworks provide inadequate foundations for the ideas of positive freedom and 
positive obligation, and for rights-based claims arising from famines, hunger and poverty (1982c; 
1987a, 56-57&70-78; 1996). Hence in Sen’s view:   
“(T)he failure to introduce fulfilment and non-realization of rights in the evaluation of states of 
affairs produces a lacuna that can scarcely be made good either by inflexible deontological 
constraints used without consequential evaluation or by trying to catch the importance of rights in 
terms of the metric of utilities” (1982a,13). “(T)he greatest scope for moral obligation to relieve 
hunger may arise in particular moral structures which are consequentialist but not welfarist” 
(1982c, 358). 
Against this background, Sen has advocated the development of new frameworks for rights-
based reasoning in which the violation and fulfilment of the “traditional” negative freedoms (liberty, 
non-discrimination, freedom of expression etc.) - as well as claims like “the right to freedom from 
hunger” and “the right to adequate means”  - can be analysed more adequately. Many of Sen’s 
ideas - including those of metarights (1982c), entitlements (1981; 1982c; 1984, 310-315), 
capability and functioning (1982b,1984,1985abc,1987b,1992a,1993), wellbeing and agency freedom (1985b), effective freedom and counterfactual choice (1992a, 66-69; 1993, 44-46) and 
social-choice-formulations of freedom and rights (1970,1991,1992b,1996) - are directly relevant to 
this project. These ideas challenge the outcome-independent characterisations of freedom and 
rights proposed in Hayek (1960, 1982) and Nozick (1974). They suggest an alternative framework 
for valuing negative and positive freedoms, and for grounding negative obligations of restraint and 
omission, as well positive obligations of protection, support and aid. In this way, “minimal 
demands of well-being (in the form of basic functionings, e.g. not to be hungry), and of well-being 
freedom (in the form of minimal capabilities, e.g. having the means of avoiding hunger)”, can be 
characterised as rights that “command attention and call for support” (1985b, 217).  
Sen has developed the idea of a capability-rights system in this context. In contrast to Nozick’s 
(1974) characterisation of rights as side-constraints, and Dworkin’s (1977) characterisation of 
rights as trumps, Sen has suggested that the fulfilment of individual rights be included among the 
goals of a system. In this way, the violation and fulfilment of individual rights can be incorporated 
into the evaluation of end-states, and be related to negative and positive obligations through 
consequential links (1982a, 1985c). Furthermore, Sen has proposed that:  
“There is … some advantage in characterising goal-rights as a relation not primarily between two 
parties but between one person and some “capability” to which he has a right, for example, the 
capability of person i to move about without harm. This rather blurs the distinction between rights 
that relate to so-called positive freedoms and those related to negative freedoms such as liberty 
and non-coercion. If all goal-rights take the form of rights to certain capabilities, then a goal-rights 
system may be conveniently called a capability-rights system” (1982a, 16). 
Whereas the classic view characterises rights as the logical correlates of obligations, and 
emphasises the relationship between distinct agents (e.g. between one person and another 
person, or between one person and the state), Sen’s idea of goal-rights focuses on the 
relationship between one agent and a goal or outcome to which that agent has rights (1982c, 
347). Hence “goal-rights may or may not be formulated in terms of two-person right-duty 
correspondences”, and can take the form of “capability-rights and corresponding duties” (1982a, 
38). The idea of a “basic capability-human rights-government obligations” approach builds on this 
proposal. This idea focuses on a tripartite relationship between basic capabilities, human rights 
and government obligations. It suggests that the fulfilment of human rights that protect and 
promote the exercise of basic capabilities be included among the goals of a system, incorporated 
into the evaluation of states of affairs, and related to government obligations through 
consequential links. This idea could provide a conceptual and practical basis for apportioning 
obligations on governments and a powerful framework for thinking about accountability (Vizard, 
1999). 
Conclusion  
This paper has surveyed some of the antecedents of the idea of human rights in different countries 
and cultures. It has suggested that although the natural law and natural rights traditions are 
important influences on the modern idea of human rights, this idea has not emerged exclusively in 
or from any single cultural tradition. Traditions of universalism, tolerance, freedom, concern for the 
poor and needy, interpersonal obligation and government responsibility are present in diverse 
cultures and countries, providing foundations for the development of modern theories of human 
rights. Furthermore, the modern idea of human rights is itself changing and evolving in response to 
diverse influences. New frameworks for thinking about the cross-cultural foundations of human 
rights are emerging, and there is a need for new theoretical frameworks for thinking about human 
rights, poverty and development. The emerging paradigm shift in ethics, economics and development away from welfare and utilitarianism - and towards capabilities and rights -is central to 
this agenda.  
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